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SIMILARLY SITUATED
Giovanna Shay*

Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legisla
tion which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere
of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.1

The same is true of turkeys but not of chickens, even though “a bred chicken and a bred tur
key are similarly situated. Each has feathers and two legs.” 2
[A]ll of the lots . . . are similarly situated with respect to the asphalt pavement.3

INTRODUCTION
In recent marriage equality litigation, opponents of same-sex marriage
have argued that gay and straight couples are not “similarly situated” with
respect to the purposes of the marriage statutes.4 Courts in Iowa,5 Connecti
cut,6 and California7 have rejected these arguments (although the California

*

Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Thanks to the
indefatigable John Boston for conversations that helped to germinate the idea for this Article, to Bill
Araiza, Miriam Baer, Marc Blitz, Erin Buzuvis, Courtney Cahill, Michael Cahill, Lauren Carasik,
G. Jack Chin, Beth Cohen, Taylor Flynn, James Forman, Jr., Suzanne Goldberg, Harris Freeman, Jeanne
Kaiser, Johanna Kalb, Katrina Kuh, Christopher Lasch, Jennifer Levi, Hillel Levin, Matthew Lister,
Chris Lund, Dan Markel, Myra Orlen, Kermit Roosevelt, Sudha Setty, Robert Tsai, Howard Wasser
man, and Verity Winship for helpful comments, and to Julie McKenna and Kelly Corrigan for research
assistance. Also, thanks to Joslyn Aubin.
1 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
2 United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 688 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 174 (1961)).
3 French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 345 (1901).
4 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435 n.54 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. C ONST. art. I, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through 2010), as recognized in Strauss v. Hor
ton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 423-24 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009); see also Courtney Megan Cahill, Celebrating the Differences That Could
Make a Difference: United States v. Virginia and a New Vision of Sexual Equality, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
943, 964 (2009) (noting that marriage equality opponents in California and Iowa had “tried to argue,
again unsuccessfully, that the ‘[same sex couple] plaintiffs are not similarly situated to opposite-sex
couples so as to necessitate further equal protection analysis because the plaintiffs cannot ‘procreate
naturally’” (alteration in original) (quoting Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882)).
5 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883-84.
6 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424.
7 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54.
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result was overturned by Proposition 8, 8 which itself was invalidated by a
district court as this Article was being written9). The Iowa and California
courts also questioned the structure of the “similarly situated” analysis
asserted by the opponents.10 Marriage equality opponents in those states
pressed a “threshold”-type similarly situated analysis.11 Under this scheme,
if the two groups are not similarly situated, there is no need to proceed to
the merits of equal protection review. 12 Judges in Iowa and California noted
that this asserted formulation permits an end-run around full equal protec
tion analysis,13 which properly focuses on the “fit” between the legislative
classification and the purpose of the statute.14
This Article asks, “what is the meaning of the phrase ‘similarly
situated’?”15 At first blush, the question appears simple, but it has farreaching implications. As Professors Joseph Tussman and Jacobus
tenBroek asked in a foundational 1949 article setting out today’s prevailing
understanding of equal protection,16 “The question is . . . what does that
ambiguous and crucial phrase ‘similarly situated’ mean?”17 More than sixty
8

CAL. C ONST. art. I, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through 2010) (codifying Proposition 8, passed
Nov. 4, 2008), invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also
Jennifer L. Levi, Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples: Where We Are and Where We Are Going,
22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 55, 69 (2009) (discussing the marriage equality landscape).
9 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme
Court of California to determine whether the proponents of Proposition 8 have standing to defend the
initiative’s constitutionality. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011).
10 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 884 n.9.
11 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882.
12 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882.
13 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883-84.
14 See William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional Roles: The Fate of the Equal
Protection Class of One and What It Means for Congressional Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights,
62 SMU L. REV. 27, 57 (2009) [hereinafter Araiza, Constitutional Rules] (identifying a “concern with
‘fit’ analysis in traditional equal protection doctrine”); William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in
Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493, 505 (2007) [hereinafter Araiza,
Irrationality and Animus] (noting the importance of “fit” in equal protection analysis); see also William
R. Engles, The “Substantial Relation” Question in Gender Discrimination Cases, 52 U. C HI. L. REV.
149, 152 (1985) (“The test thus requires a certain ‘fit’ between the classification at issue and the goal
that the legislature seeks to achieve through that classification.”).
15 This Article includes within its survey the phrase “similarly circumstanced” and other phrases
that are variations on “similarly situated.”
16 See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 358 (1999) (describing Tussman and tenBroek’s
article as “influential”); Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the
Forgotten, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 343 (1998) (describing Tussman and tenBroek’s article as “articu
lat[ing] . . . the [now] standard conception of the [Equal Protection] Clause”).
17 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF . L. REV.
341, 345 (1949). More recently, Professor Martha Minow has formulated the question as “What differ
ences . . . should matter, and for what purposes?” MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE D IFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 374 (1990).
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years later, their question remains vital, surfacing prominently, but not ex
clusively, in marriage equality litigation. 18
Although the phrase “similarly situated” is a familiar component of
equal protection case law, it has not received much scholarly attention. 19
Constitutional law scholars have focused more on other aspects of the doc
trine.20 To the author’s knowledge, this Article is the first to examine the
phrase “similarly situated.”
The words “similarly situated” appeared in equal protection doctrine
long before the advent of the modern, “tiered” form of equal protection
analysis, which employs varying levels of scrutiny based on the protected
class.21 Of course, the words “similarly situated” are not a part of the Four
teenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.22 The concept of being “simi
larly situated” developed in doctrinal contexts other than equal protection,
including cases involving property, and then entered the U.S. Supreme
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in 1884 in a case involving a San
Francisco ordinance targeting laundries run by Chinese immigrants,23 a pre
cursor to Yick Wo v. Hopkins.24
After gaining currency in equal protection case law, the phrase “simi
larly situated” migrated beyond Fourteenth Amendment litigation into other
18

See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 386 (D. Mass. 2010); In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882-84, 884 n.9.
19 While the “similarly situated” requirement itself has not received extensive scholarly attention,
commentators have criticized its application in certain contexts, including cases on behalf of women
prisoners, discussed infra notes 95-111. But see Engles, supra note 14, at 154-56 (describing the distinc
tion between the “similarly situated” test and the “gender neutral” test in the Court’s early gender dis
crimination cases (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20 Although it is impossible to catalogue all scholarship on the Equal Protection Clause, this
Article mentions some works examining complementary aspects of equal protection analysis. See, e.g.,
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 482 (2004) (explaining the
history of the “tiered” structure of review and proposing a single standard); Gerald Gunther, Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 17 (1972) (identifying a trend toward intermediate scrutiny); Michael A. Helfand, The Usual
Suspect Classifications: Criminals, Aliens and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage, 12 U. PA. J. C ONST. L.
1, 16 (2009) (questioning whether a trait must be “immutable” to qualify for heightened protection as a
suspect class); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV.
213, 213-19 (1991) (describing the history of standards of scrutiny); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750, 754 (2011) (advocating a “liberty-based dignity claim” as a
remedy for “[t]he [e]xhaustion of [t]raditional [g]roup-[b]ased [e]qual [p]rotection”).
21 See Goldberg, supra note 20, at 485 (“The Court did not articulate detailed indicia for discern
ing which classifications [are suspect and which quasi-suspect] until the early 1970s . . . .”); Melissa L.
Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 301-02
(1997) (noting that the Court developed “rigid multi-tiered standard of review” in the mid-twentieth
century).
22 U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885); see also David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and
the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 234-36 (1999).
24 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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doctrinal contexts.25 As of the writing of this Article, more than 1,000 U.S.
Supreme Court opinions and orders mentioned the phrase.26 In addition to
equal protection analysis, the phrase “similarly situated” appears in cases
involving tax law,27 the Clean Water Act,28 the commerce clause,29 share
holder actions,30 class action certification,31 social security, 32 employment
25

See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure:
From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 361-62 (2001) (discussing the
use of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause in the criminal context); Nelson Tebbe &
Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 (2010) (describing the phenome
non of “constitutional borrowing” (emphasis omitted)).
26 Based on a search of the Westlaw Supreme Court database for the phrase (“similarly w/5
situated”) as of February 12, 2011. If the search is expanded to include (“similarly w/5 circumstanced”),
the number of cases retrieved jumps even higher.
27 E.g., United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843, 847-48 (1996) (“The true construction of [the Export
Clause] is that no burden by way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation of articles, and does not
mean that articles exported are relieved from the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all
property similarly situated.” (quoting Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States, 479 U.S. 442, 447 (1987) (stating that “em
ployers and lenders are similarly situated under the Code”); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 439 U.S.
522, 544 (1979) (“Variances . . . are questionable in a tax system designed to ensure as far as possible
that similarly situated taxpayers pay the same tax.”); Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S.
345, 354 (1971) (referring to “similarly situated insured savings and loan associations”).
28 E.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asking
whether wetlands, “alone or in combination with similarly situated lands,” affect the integrity of naviga
ble waterways); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 203
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing a case in which the plaintiff sought an injunction “on behalf of
herself, her child, and all others similarly situated”).
29 E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (“That appellee’s own contribution to
the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is
far from trivial.”); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 556 (1995).
30 E.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 526 n.3 (1984) (“The derivative action may
not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.”
(quoting FED. R. C IV. P. 23.1) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333
(1969); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 338 (1960); Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531,
534 (1941) (using the phrase “all other shareholders similarly situated”); Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parm
ley, 302 U.S. 233, 236 (1937) (using the phrase “as between all stockholders similarly situated the
burden of paying the debts shall be borne ratably”); Pearsall v. Great N. Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 648
(1896) (“The suit was brought for the benefit of the plaintiff and all stockholders similarly situated.”);
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 430 (1895), superseded by statute as recognized in
Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Comm’r, 277 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1960) (using the phrase “on behalf of himself
and all other stockholders of the defendant company similarly situated”); Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J. v. Mills,
113 U.S. 249, 256 (1885) (using the phrase “in behalf of themselves and other stockholders similarly
situated”).
31 E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 779 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 320 (1981) (identifying a plaintiff as “the indigent pregnant women who sued on behalf of
other women similarly situated”); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 26-27 (1974) (stating that the
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discrimination,33 standing, 34 antitrust,35 and bills of attainder.36 It appears in
numerous criminal law contexts,37 including sentencing,38 selective prosecu
tion claims,39 capital punishment, 40 Eighth Amendment proportionality
plaintiffs brought a claim “on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated”); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 121 (1973) (noting that plaintiffs “purported to sue on behalf of themselves and all other
couples similarly situated” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32 E.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983) (noting that “vocational experts frequently
were criticized for their inconsistent treatment of similarly situated claimants”).
33 E.g., Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 912 (1989) (noting that “a facially discrimi
natory seniority system (one that treats similarly situated employees differently) can be challenged at
any time”), superseded by statute as recognized in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S.
618 (2007); Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223, 227 (1988) (“The normal retirement benefit is therefore
equal for similarly situated male and female employees.”); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (“McDonell Douglas teaches that it is the plaintiff’s task to demonstrate that
similarly situated employees were not treated equally.”). See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimi
nation by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 729, 735 (2011) (criticizing the use of comparators in employ
ment discrimination law as simplistic and outmoded and arguing that “the demand for similarly situated,
better-treated others underinclusively misses important forms of discrimination”); Ernest F. Lidge III,
The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L.
REV. 831, 832 (2002) (arguing that courts have “misused this ‘similarly situated’ concept” by “re
quir[ing] the plaintiff to prove, as part of her prima facie case, that she was treated differently than
similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected group” when in fact Supreme
Court doctrine permits “plaintiffs to demonstrate a prima facie case in a variety of ways” and by “de
fin[ing] ‘similarly situated’ in an unjustifiably narrow fashion”).
34 E.g., City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98 (1983) (citing allegations “that Lyons and others
similarly situated are threatened with irreparable injury”).
35 E.g., Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 n.21 (1982) (“McCready and the
banker and the distributor are in many respects similarly situated.”).
36 E.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449 n.23 (1965) (“The vice of [bills of] attainder is
that the legislature has decided for itself that certain persons possess certain characteristics and are
therefore deserving of sanction, not that it has failed to sanction others similarly situated.”).
37 See, e.g., Howe, supra note 25, at 363 (arguing that the “criminal clauses” should be analyzed,
not under equality theory, but as “discrete protections of personal liberty”).
38 E.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 297 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
failure of judges “to sentence similarly situated defendants in a consistent, reasonable manner” (quoting
130 CONG. REC. 976 (1984) (statement of Sen. Paul Laxalt))); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
332 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing systems that resulted in disparate “punishment of similar
ly situated defendants”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (noting “the great varia
tion among sentences imposed by different judges upon similarly situated offenders”); Moore v. Mis
souri, 159 U.S. 673, 678 (1895) (stating that “a different punishment for the same offence may be in
flicted under particular circumstances, provided it is dealt out to all alike who are similarly situated”).
39 E.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (holding that respondents failed to
demonstrate “that the Government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects”); see also Hartman
v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 264 n.10 (2006); United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 863-64 (2002); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 605 (1985); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712 n.9 (1977); Beck v.
Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 567-68 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
40 E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1987) (refusing to find a constitutional viola
tion following a demonstration “that other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the
death penalty”); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 301 (1977) (“[P]etitioner is simply not similarly

586

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 18:3

review, 41 retroactivity analysis,42 ex post facto claims,43 and peremptory
challenges, 44 among others.45 The widespread use of the phrase no doubt
reflects the influence of the longstanding precept in Western thought that
“likes” should be treated “alike.”46
Although frequently invoked in the equal protection context, the
“similarly situated” concept is not uniformly employed in the case law.
Many important equal protection opinions contain no substantive “similarly
situated” analysis, 47 including United States v. Virginia48 and Romer v.
Evans.49 Although the recent district court decision striking down Proposi
tion 8 essentially conducts an extensive “similarly situated” analysis as part
of its equal protection review, it does not contain the exact phrase “similar
situated to those whose sentences were commuted.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 423 U.S. 153, 198 (1976)
(“[T]he Supreme Court of Georgia compares each death sentence with the sentences imposed on
similarly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not
disproportionate.”).
41 E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2050 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court
cannot point to a national consensus in favor of its rule without assuming a consensus [that] . . .
[j]uveniles are always less culpable than similarly-situated adults.”).
42 E.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (“[E]venhanded justice requires that it be
applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)
(“[S]elective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the
same.”); see also Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84 (1994); Zant v. Moore, 489 U.S. 836, 837 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (per curiam); Lego v. Illinois, 488 U.S. 902, 904 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 56 (1985); United States v. Johnson,
457 U.S. 537, 555 (1982); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 247 (1977); Jenkins v. Delaware,
395 U.S. 213, 216 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
43 E.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 431 (1987) (“[T]he revised guidelines law clearly disad
vantages petitioner and similarly situated defendants.”); see also Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229,
2233 (2010) (noting that ex post facto challenge to the Sex Offender Notification Registration Act was
“consolidated . . . with that of a similarly situated defendant”); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 443
(1997); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33 (1981).
44 E.g., Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68; 72 (1887); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
362-63 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Compare Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 247 (2005)
(“[W]hen we look for nonblack jurors similarly situated to [the juror who was struck], we find strong
similarities as well as some differences. But the differences seem far from significant . . . .” (footnote
omitted)), with id. at 291(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“‘Similarly situated’ does not mean matching any one
of several reasons the prosecution gave for striking a potential juror—it means matching all of them.”).
45 E.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2991 (2010) (“CLS was similarly
situated: It hosted a variety of activities the year after Hastings denied it recognition, and the number of
students attending those meetings and events doubled.”).
46 Compare Goldberg, supra note 33 (discussing Aristotelian roots of theories of equality and
their role in contemporary discrimination doctrine), with Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal
Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 12 LAW & I NEQ. 381, 418-21 (1994) (contrasting “arithmetic” and
“geometric” notions of equality in Greek philosophy).
47 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 375 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 n.2 (1976).
48 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
49 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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ly situated,” concluding instead that same-sex and opposite-sex couples are
“situated identically.”50 Other opinions recite oft-repeated language, such as
“Equal Protection . . . requires States to treat similarly situated persons
alike,”51 which is sometimes followed up with “[t]he Constitution does not
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same,”52 but contain little discussion of the phrase.
In their influential 1949 article, one of the few to address the meaning
of “similarly situated,” Tussman and tenBroek explained that “[a] reasona
ble classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law.”53 “Similarly situated” could
not mean merely that everyone in the class possessed the “classifying trait,”
they wrote, because that would produce the tautological result that a law
complies with equal protection if it “applies equally to all to whom it
applies.”54 If that were true, “a law applying to red-haired makers of marga
rine” would not violate equal protection.55
The aim of this Article is to explore the history and meaning of the
“similarly situated” requirement. Its thesis is that “similarly situated” analy
sis is not a preliminary hurdle that litigants must clear to proceed to equal
protection review, but rather a statement of longstanding equal protection
principles that appeared in the case law long before the development of a
multi-tiered system of scrutiny.56 Courts and litigators are sometimes uncer
tain about how to reconcile the older “similarly situated” requirement with
a tiered approach to equal protection.57 As a result, some view “similarly
situated” as a threshold analysis that must be met in order to qualify for
equal protection review. 58 It is true that equal protection plaintiffs in cases
that do not involve express categorizations, such as selective prosecution
claims, must first demonstrate that other “similarly situated” individuals

50 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (concluding that
“[r]elative gender composition aside, same-sex couples are situated identically to opposite-sex couples
in terms of their ability to perform the rights and obligations of marriage under California law” and
citing extensive findings of fact to support that assertion).
51 Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
52 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); see also Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 924 (stating
the same).
53 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 17, at 346.
54 Id. at 345. Another way of framing this type of analytic mistake—or manipulation—is as an
error in the choice of comparator. Lidge, supra note 33, at 831-33; cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Over and
Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 468 (1989) (“Equal protection plaintiffs, to be
most persuasive, will try to identify a comparison class . . . that is as similar as possible to [the class] of
which they are members.”).
55 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 17.
56 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 485, 528-29.
57 See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
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were treated differently.59 However, properly understood, “similarly
situated” is not a threshold hurdle to equal protection analysis on the merits
in cases involving facial classifications.
In cases regarding express categories, no matter the level of equal
protection scrutiny applied, the focus of the “similarly situated” analysis is
substantially the same as the key inquiry of equal protection review: Does
the legislative classification bear a close enough relationship to the purpose
of the statute?60 While courts and litigants may disagree about whether
individuals really are “similarly situated” with respect to a statutory
purpose, the analysis, properly understood, is another way of describing the
substantive equal protection inquiry.61
This Article does not take a position on whether the tiered framework
should be abandoned.62 Rather, it seeks to contextualize the phrase
“similarly situated.” It explains how “similarly situated” has its origins in
the older understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as a bar on “class
legislation” or legislation intended to disadvantage a class of citizens, 63 how
it is properly understood as a restatement of the “fit” analysis 64 most closely
associated with “rational basis with bite”65 and intermediate scrutiny,66 and

59

See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (“To establish a discriminatory
effect in a race case [alleging selective prosecution], the claimant must show that similarly situated
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.”).
60 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); see also
3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. N OWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.2(a), at 300 (4th ed. 2008) (“Usually one must look to the end or purpose of the legis
lation in order to determine whether persons are similarly situated in terms of that governmental sys
tem.”); Araiza, Constitutional Rules, supra note 14; Araiza, Irrationality and Animus, supra note 14, at
502-05; Goldberg, supra note 20, at 516 (describing the relationship between classification and statutory
aim as “the underlying purpose of equal protection review”); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 17.
61 See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
62 Cf. Goldberg supra note 20, at 484, 494-518 (explaining the history of the “tiered” structure of
review and proposing a single standard).
63 See infra notes 173-75, 181-184 and accompanying text; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution . . . neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Goldberg, supra note 20,
at 528 (arguing that the “first principle” of equal protection has always been “preventing enforcement of
class legislation”); Saunders, supra note 21, at 331.
64 See Araiza, Constitutional Rules, supra note 14; Araiza, Irrationality and Animus, supra note
14, at 502-05.
65 See Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2774 (2005); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Inter
mediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779-80 (1987).
66 See Goldberg, supra note 20, at 540 (“[T]he core concerns of rational basis and heightened
review overlap in certain important respects, including their shared commitment to assessing the rela
tionship between potential justifications for a classification and the classification itself.”).
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how it could play a role in a unified approach to equal protection analysis if
the tiers become less salient.67
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the problem by
looking at an area of litigation in which the threshold “similarly situated”
requirement has been hotly contested—marriage equality. 68 Part II traces
the origins of the phrase in equal protection doctrine. Part III draws on this
historical description to discuss the proper application of “similarly
situated” in modern equal protection analysis.
In a properly conducted equal protection analysis, the identification of
statutory purpose becomes the major contest.69 This is demonstrated vividly
in the marriage equality cases, in which divisions regarding the definition of
the social institution play out in the doctrinal analysis.
I.

THE TROUBLE: A “THRESHOLD” SIMILARLY SITUATED REQUIREMENT

This Article is prompted by a problem. Some litigants and judges have
unmoored “similarly situated” from its origins and grafted it onto the tiered
equal protection approach as an antecedent requirement to “fit” analysis. In
cases in state courts in Iowa,70 Connecticut,71 and California,72 opponents of
marriage equality argued that because same-sex couples were not similarly
situated to heterosexual couples, further equal protection analysis was
unnecessary.73 In each of these three jurisdictions, that argument was
properly rejected, 74 although it was accepted by some dissenters.75 The Iowa
67

Id. at 549-50.
Some commentators have noted that the marriage equality movement’s heavy reliance on
arguments that gay couples are “the same” as their straight counterparts places “similarly situated”
analysis front-and-center. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Disgust and the Problematic Politics of Similari
ty, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 12) (on file with the George Mason Law
Review) (describing similarity politics in marriage equality litigation). Professor Courtney Cahill draws
on Professor Marc Spindelman’s description of “like-straight” claims to argue that “like-straight reason
ing simply reflects the formal equality principle . . . [that] similarly situated individuals, and like cases,
must be treated alike.” Id. (manuscript at 13).
69 Simons, supra note 54, at 460.
70 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 884 n.9 (Iowa 2009).
71 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 423-24 (Conn. 2008).
72 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435 n.54 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. C ONST. art. I, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through 2010), as recognized in Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D.
Cal. 2010).
73 See Cahill, supra note 4. Although many of these same themes regarding the purpose of mar
riage were litigated in the 2003 Massachusetts marriage equality victory, Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health, the claims were not analyzed under the rubric of “similarly situated.” See id. at 953.
74 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 423-24; Varnum, 763
N.W.2d at 884 n.9. Of course, in other states, equal protection arguments for marriage equality have
been rejected. See Levi, supra note 8, at 56 & n.4 (describing defeats for proponents of marriage
equality in Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington). However, this Article focuses
68
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and California courts went beyond determining that same-sex and oppositesex couples were “similarly situated,” further questioning the formulation
of a threshold “similarly situated” analysis. 76
Because all three of these cases involved state constitutional claims,
there were important differences in the constitutional analyses, most
notably the level of scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual
orientation.77 Nonetheless, all three courts’ equal protection analyses were
informed by federal equal protection concepts and precedent,78 and as Part
II demonstrates, the phrase “similarly situated” has a long history in federal
equal protection case law.
The Iowa Supreme Court in Varnum v. Brien79 discussed the role of a
“similarly situated” analysis at some length.80 The Varnum court described
the “similarly situated” requirement as “a narrow threshold test.”81 It
explained that it had “utilized this test in the past” and that “if plaintiffs
cannot show as a preliminary matter that they are similarly situated, courts
do not further consider whether their different treatment under a statute is
permitted under the equal protection clause.”82
Nonetheless, the Iowa court refused to merely focus on asserted differ
ences between the two groups, but continued on to emphasize the “fit”
analysis at this initial step. “[T]o truly ensure equality before the law,” it
on the opinions in which marriage equality opponents offered threshold-type “similarly situated”
arguments like those presented in the women prisoners’ cases.
75 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 464 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting) (“A statute does
not violate equal protection when it recognizes real distinctions that are pertinent to the law’s legitimate
aims.”); id. at 470 (Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 519 (Zarrella, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] couple that is incapable of engaging in the type of sexual conduct that can result in
children is not similarly situated to a couple that is capable of engaging in such conduct with respect to
legislation that is intended to privilege and regulate that conduct.”).
76 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 884 n.9.
77 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401 (treating sexual orientation as a suspect classification);
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412 (concluding that gay persons constitute a quasi-suspect class); Varnum, 763
N.W.2d at 896 (employing intermediate scrutiny); cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sarah Hinger & Keren
Zwick, Equality Opportunity: Marriage Litigation and Iowa’s Equal Protection Law, 12 J. GENDER
RACE & J UST. 107, 109 (2008) (introducing an amicus brief filed in Varnum advocating an independent
analysis of Iowa’s equal protection guarantee).
78 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 420 (discussing federal precedent in construing the
California Constitution); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 420 (“[A]lthough we may follow the analytical
approach taken by courts construing the federal constitution, our use of that approach for purposes of the
state constitution will not necessarily lead to the same result as that arrived at under the federal constitu
tion.”); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 878 n.6 (“[W]e view the federal and state equal protection clauses as
‘identical in scope, import, and purpose.’. . . Here again, we find federal precedent instructive in inter
preting the Iowa Constitution, but we refuse to follow it blindly.” (quoting Callender v. Skiles,
591 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 1999))).
79 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
80 Id. at 884 n.9.
81 Id. at 882.
82 Id.
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wrote, “the equal protection guarantee requires that laws treat all those who
are similarly situated with respect to the purposes of the law alike.”83 “The
purposes of the law must be referenced in order to meaningfully evaluate
whether the law equally protects all people similarly situated with respect to
those purposes,” it explained. 84
Even more relevant here, the Varnum court questioned the “useful
ness” of deploying a “similarly situated” test as a threshold requirement and
“express[ed] caution in the future use of the threshold analysis.”85 While it
had applied the “similarly situated” requirement as a threshold test, the
Iowa court explained that it had also “directly or indirectly infused that
analysis with principles traditionally applied in the complete equal protec
tion analysis.”86
This approach was “almost inevitable,” it wrote, if the test was “to
have any real value as an analytical tool to resolve equal protection
claims.”87 Because the Varnum plaintiffs had satisfied the “similarly
situated” threshold standard, the Iowa court reserved for future cases the
question of whether “similarly situated” analysis should be conducted as a
preliminary requirement of equal protection. 88
After calling into question the threshold nature of the test, the Iowa
court then conducted the “similarly situated” analysis.89 Citing Tussman and
tenBroek’s article, the court stated that whether two groups are “similarly
situated” cannot be defined solely by the trait identified by the legislature in
drafting the statute.90 The Iowa court concluded that the plaintiffs were
“similarly situated” to straight couples because they “[we]re in committed
and loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual
couples.”91 This meant that the plaintiffs were “similarly situated in every
important respect, but for their sexual orientation,” for the purpose of Iowa
marriage laws, “which are designed to bring a sense of order to the legal
relationships of committed couples and their families in myriad ways.”92
The Varnum court concluded its “similarly situated” analysis by noting
that the classifying trait alone (i.e., sexual orientation) could not justify the
legislative distinction if plaintiffs were otherwise similarly situated. 93 It
wrote that the conception of the “similarly situated” requirement pressed by

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 883.
Id.
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 884 n.9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 882-84.
Id. at 882-83 (citing Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 17, at 344-47).
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883.
Id. at 883-84.
Id. at 882-84.
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the County was “circular” and would result in “all distinctions . . . evad[ing]
equal protection review.”94
It is not surprising that the threshold variant of “similarly situated”
appeared in Iowa. This formulation of the requirement first gained visibility
in the Eighth Circuit in a 1994 opinion rejecting a women prisoners’ equal
protection challenge to educational and vocational prison programs. 95 The
Eighth Circuit concluded that women prisoners were not “similarly
situated” to prisoners in male institutions in the same state system. 96 In
making this determination, it identified several factors: the number of pris
oners of each sex, their security level, the types of crimes they were con
victed of committing, the lengths of their sentences, and “special
characteristics” of the prisoners.97 The “special characteristics” of women
prisoners identified by the court included that many had been physically or
sexually abused, were single-parent primary caretakers, and were convicted
of nonviolent crimes.98 Because the Eighth Circuit concluded that female
prisoners were not “similarly situated” to male inmates, it rejected the
plaintiffs’ equal protection claims without proceeding to the merits.99
The Eighth Circuit “threshold” variant of similarly situated analysis
was adopted in a series of women prisoners’ equal protection cases, 100
including another Eighth Circuit decision out of Iowa.101 The D.C. Circuit
also relied on this same reasoning two years later in Women Prisoners v.
District of Columbia.102 In a spirited dissent, Judge Judith Rogers criticized
the majority’s “similarly situated” analysis for reasons similar to those
advanced here. 103 Judge Rogers argued that a court cannot determine
whether individuals in two groups are “similarly situated” without
analyzing “the purpose for which the government is acting.”104 Instead of
94

Id. at 884.
Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 731-32.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 731.
Absent a threshold showing that [the plaintiff] is similarly situated to those who allegedly
receive favorable treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim. Thus,
before we may reach the merits of their equal protection claim, we must determine if the
plaintiffs and [male Nebraska] inmates are similarly situated.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 925 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (“The threshold inquiry in evaluating an equal protection claim is, therefore, ‘to determine
whether a person is similarly situated to those persons who allegedly received favorable treatment.’”
(quoting United States v. Whiton, 48 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1995))).
100 See Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep’t. of Corr. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2009);
Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 647-49 (8th Cir. 1996); Pargo v. Elliott, 69 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir.
1995) (per curiam).
101 See Pargo, 69 F.3d at 280.
102 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
103 Id. at 954-55 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 954.
95
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focusing on the relationship between the classification and the purpose of
the government action, Judge Rogers explained, the majority “fixate[d]” on
“irrelevancies” like the size of the two facilities.105 She wrote that the court
should first “[d]etermin[e] the purpose of government action before
embarking on a similarly-situated analysis.”106
The reasoning of the women prisoners’ majority opinions has been
criticized, 107 with commentators arguing that the analysis is “circular,”108
that it “perpetuate[s] the gender-based stereotypes that the women prisoners
were challenging,”109 and that it undercuts equal protection review. 110 Some
of this commentary was cited by the Iowa Supreme Court in questioning the
formulation of the threshold “similarly situated” requirement.111
Nonetheless, the “threshold” variant of “similarly situated” has gained
some currency following the women prisoners cases, mostly in state courts
concentrated in a few jurisdictions,112 including most notably Iowa,113 Ne
105

Id.
Id. at 954-55.
107 See Donna L. Laddy, Can Women Prisoners Be Carpenters? A Proposed Analysis for Equal
Protection Claims of Gender Discrimination in Educational and Vocational Programming at Women’s
Prisons, 5 TEMP. POL. & C IV. RTS . L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1995); Angie Baker, Note, Leapfrogging over
Equal Protection Analysis: The Eighth Circuit Sanctions Separate and Unequal Facilities for Males and
Females in Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994), 76 NEB. L. REV. 371,
397-98 (1997); Natasha L. Carroll-Ferrary, Note, Incarcerated Men and Women, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Requirement of “Similarly Situated”, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 595, 602-08 (2006);
Jennifer Arnett Lee, Note, Women Prisoners, Penological Interests, and Gender Stereotyping: An
Application of Equal Protection Norms to Female Inmates, 32 COLUM. H UM. RTS . L. REV. 251, 283-86
(2000). Inmates in women’s prisons did win some early equal protection victories. See, e.g., Canterino
v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 206, 213 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (concluding that disparities between men’s and
women’s prisons in Kentucky violated equal protection), aff’d, 875 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1989); Glover v.
Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1083 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (noting the same in Michigan institutions).
108 Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 Y ALE J.L. & FEMINISM 225, 275 (2003).
109 Carroll-Ferrary, supra note 107, at 603.
110 Baker, supra note 107, at 386; Carroll-Ferrary, supra note 107, at 610-11.
111 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 884 n.9 (Iowa 2009) (citing Laddy, supra note 107, at 22
23; Baker, supra note 107, at 385).
112 “Similarly situated” is referred to as a “threshold” test in some lower federal court opinions, but
usually in cases alleging disparate treatment under a facially neutral law, in which the plaintiff must
demonstrate that some discrimination is taking place. See, e.g., Habhab v. Horn, 536 F.3d 963, 967
(8th Cir. 2008) (stating that plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that state police had treated them “less
favorably than similarly-situated . . . companies”); United States v. Jones, 287 F.3d 325, 333 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding that a defendant alleging selective prosecution had failed to make the threshold statistical
“showing that he was singled out for prosecution” and “that others similarly situated were not”); Fales v.
Garst, 235 F.3d 1122, 1123 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“[T]he plaintiffs failed to offer specific evi
dence of incidents in which they were treated differently than others who were similarly situated.”);
Domina v. Van Pelt, 235 F.3d 1091, 1099 (8th Cir. 2000) (“The threshold inquiry in an equal protection
case is whether the plaintiff is similarly situated to others who allegedly received preferential treat
ment.”); Arnold v. City of Columbia, 197 F.3d 1217, 1220 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[A]ppellants were required,
as a threshold matter, to demonstrate that they were treated differently from others similarly situated to
them.”). See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 60, at 297-99 (“[A] law may have no imper
106
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braska,114 Kansas,115 Colorado,116 California,117 and Illinois.118 Varnum cites
other Iowa cases describing “similarly situated” as the first step of equal
protection analysis, which must be satisfied to proceed with the merits
analysis.119 Indeed, some of the Iowa cases describe “similarly situated” as a
threshold requirement even in cases requiring only rational basis review. 120
The argument for a “threshold” type of similarly situated analysis also
has surfaced in marriage equality litigation in California and Connecticut.
missible classification by its own terms but it may be applied in such a way as to create a classifica
tion.”).
113 See infra notes 119-20.
114 See, e.g., Benitez v. Rasmussen, 626 N.W.2d 209, 219 (Neb. 2001) (“Absent this threshold
showing, one lacks a viable equal protection claim.”); Gramercy Hill Enters. v. State, 587 N.W.2d 378,
383 (Neb. 1998) (“It is fundamental that ‘the initial inquiry in an equal protection analysis focuses on
whether one has demonstrated that one was treated differently than others similarly situated. Absent this
threshold showing, one lacks a viable equal protection claim.’” (quoting State v. Atkins, 549 N.W.2d
159, 163 (Neb. 1996))).
115 See, e.g., In re Weisgerber, 169 P.3d 321, 328 (Kan. 2007) (“[A] threshold requirement for
stating an equal protection claim is to demonstrate that the challenged statutory enactment treats
‘arguably indistinguishable’ classes of people differently.” (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609
(1974))).
116 See, e.g., Eller v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 224 P.3d 397, 400 (Colo. App. 2009) (“The
threshold question in any equal protection challenge is whether the legislation results in dissimilar
treatment of similarly situated individuals.”); Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 911 P.2d 667, 668-69 (Colo.
App. 1996) (“The threshold question in any equal protection challenge, therefore, is whether the legisla
tion results in dissimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals.”).
117 See, e.g., Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 669 (Cal. 2002).
“The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing
that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in
an unequal manner.” This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all
purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting In re Eric J., 601 P.2d 549, 552 (Cal. 1979)); see also People v.
Buffington, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 701 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating that an equal protection claim requires a
finding that persons are similarly situated under the challenged law).
118 See, e.g., People v. Whitfield, 888 N.E.2d 1166, 172 (Ill. 2007) (“[W]e cannot go so far as to
apply the rational basis test in this case because defendant cannot meet the threshold requirement for an
equal protection claim—demonstrating that he and the group he compares himself to are similarly
situated.”).
119 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009) (citing Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v.
Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 757 N.W.2d 172, 176-77 (Iowa 2008); In re Det. of Hennings, 744 N.W.2d
333, 338-40 (Iowa 2008); Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2002)).
120 In Grovijohn, for example, the Iowa Court wrote:
The first step of an equal protection claim is to identify the classes of similarly situated plain
tiffs singled out for differential treatment. . . . Because Grovijohn has not satisfied the first
step of an equal protection analysis, we do not address whether the [statute at issue] has a
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.
643 N.W.2d at 204; see also Timberland Partners, 757 N.W.2d at 175 (“The first step of an equal pro
tection [analysis] is to identify the classes of similarly situated persons singled out for differential treat
ment.” (quoting Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Iowa 2007)) (altera
tion in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Hennings, 744 N.W.2d at 339 (“If the two
groups are not similarly situated, we need not scrutinize the legislature’s differing treatment of them.”).
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In California, opponents of marriage equality in In re Marriage Cases 121
pressed a “threshold” similarly situated argument “that same-sex couples
and opposite sex couples are not ‘similarly situated’ with regard to the
challenged statute’s legitimate purpose.”122 Although two dissenters
accepted this threshold formulation, the majority rejected it, explaining that
it “in reality would insulate the challenged marriage statute from any
meaningful equal protection review” by “assertedly obviating any need for
this court even to consider which standard of review applies to plaintiffs’
equal protection claim.”123 The In re Marriage Cases majority concluded
that same-sex and opposite-sex couples were in fact “similarly situated,”
explaining that “[b]oth groups at issue consist of pairs of individuals who
wish to enter into a formal, legally binding and officially recognized, longterm family relationship.”124
In Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,125 Connecticut oppo
nents of marriage equality also advocated a form of “similarly situated”
analysis that could sidestep full equal protection review. 126 They “assert[ed]
that the plaintiffs [were] not similarly situated to opposite sex couples” and
that this fact “thereby obviat[ed] the need for [the] court to engage in an
equal protection analysis.”127 Unlike the Iowa and California courts, the
Connecticut court did not question the threshold nature of a “similarly
situated” inquiry.128 Like in Iowa, some prior Connecticut case law referred
to the “similarly situated” requirement as a “threshold” requirement of an
equal protection challenge. 129 The Connecticut majority explained that a
statute violates equal protection if “either on its face or in practice, [it]

121

183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5
(West, Westlaw through 2010), as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), invalidated
by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
122 Id. at 435 n.54; see Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund Answer to Petitioners’
Opening Briefs on the Substantive Issues at 49, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008)
(No. S147999) (“Petitioners cannot meet the threshold for an equal protection challenge. Accordingly,
this Court should not even consider what standard of review would be appropriate for the alleged equal
protection claims.”).
123 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54.
124 Id.
125 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
126 Id. at 423-24; Brief of Defendant-Appellees with Appendix at 19, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (No. S.C. 17716) (“[I]n any equal protection challenge, the plaintiffs
must show, as a threshold matter, that the statute at issue treats similarly situated people differently.”).
127 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 423-34.
128 Id. at 424.
129 See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 761 A.2d 705, 722 (Conn. 2000), rev’d on other grounds,
353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 670 (Conn. 1998) (“[T]he defendants
must show, as a threshold matter, that [the statute] either on its face or as applied, treats similarly si
tuated individuals differently.”).
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treat[s] persons standing in the same relation to it differently.”130
“[Accordingly],” the majority continued, “the analytical predicate [of an
equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons [purport
ing to be] similarly situated.”131
Although accepting the “threshold” or “initial” nature of the inquiry,
the Connecticut majority nonetheless focused on “fit,” reiterating that the
question is “not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but
whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.” 132
The majority ultimately concluded that same-sex and opposite-sex couples
were “similarly situated” for the reasons articulated by the California court
in In re Marriage Cases.133
The “similarly situated” analysis in the marriage equality opinions
exposes different conceptions of marriage. 134 Marriage equality opponents
defined the purpose of the marriage statutes narrowly as regulating “natu
ral” reproduction.135 A Connecticut dissenter, Justice Peter Zarella, con
curred with this assessment. 136 “[B]ecause the long-standing, fundamental
purpose of our marriage laws is to privilege and regulate procreative
conduct,” he wrote, “those laws do not classify on the basis of sexual orien
tation and . . . persons who wish to enter into a same sex marriage are not

130 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 421 (quoting Stuart v. Comm’r of Corr., 834 A.2d 52, 56 (Conn. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
131 Id. at 421-22 (alterations in original) (quoting Stuart, 834 A.2d at 56) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
132 Id. at 422 (quoting Stuart, 834 A.2d at 56).
133 Id. at 424.
134 Cf. MINOW, supra note 17, at 108 (noting that “similarly situated” analysis “retains a general
presumption that differences reside in the different person rather than in relation to norms embedded in
the prevailing institutions”). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, although not turning on “similarly situated” analysis, also focused on the
construction of marriage as an institution and the purpose of the marriage statutes. 798 N.E.2d. 941, 961
(Mass. 2003) (“The judge in the Superior Court [held] that ‘the state’s interest in regulating marriage is
based on the traditional concept that marriage’s primary purpose is procreation.’ This is incorrect. Our
laws of civil marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married people
above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of creating a family.”); see also Nelson
Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1377
(2010) (urging adoption of an “equal access” litigation theory for marriage equality, emphasizing the
concept of marriage as a government-supported institution).
135 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009); see Final Brief of DefendantAppellant at 24, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No. 07-1499) (“Plaintiffs are not
similarly situated to opposite sex couples. That is a matter of common knowledge. Plaintiffs, as couples,
are not capable of procreating naturally and are not similarly situated to opposite sex couples who can
naturally procreate.”).
136 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 516-17 (Zarella, J., dissenting). Justice David Borden also dissented, but
wrote, “I also agree with the majority that the plaintiffs are similarly situated with respect to opposite
sex couples regarding the right to marry.” Id. at 483 n.6 (Borden, J., dissenting).
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similarly situated to persons who wish to enter into a traditional
marriage.”137
A dissenting Justice of the California Supreme Court went even fur
ther. Acknowledging that the question “is not whether persons are similarly
situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for pur
poses of the law challenged,’” Justice Carol Corrigan responded by wholly
identifying the statutory purpose with the traditional conception of
marriage.138 “The legitimate purpose of the statutes defining marriage is to
preserve the traditional understanding of the institution,”139 she wrote. 140
One of her colleagues concurred: “Same-sex and opposite-sex couples
cannot be similarly situated for that limited purpose.”141
By contrast, by rejecting limited definitions of the social institution at
issue, the majorities in the marriage equality cases were able to move away
from a cramped “similarly situated” analysis142 and to focus on commonali
ties among the litigants.143

137

Id. at 516 (Zarella, J., dissenting).
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 470 (Cal. 2008) (Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 669 (Cal. 2002)), superseded by constitutional amend
ment, CAL. C ONST. art. I, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through 2010), as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207
P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
139 Id.
140 Deborah Hellman makes a distinction between “proxy” and “non-proxy” discrimination. Hellman, supra note 16, at 316-17.
141 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 464 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
142 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883-84 (Iowa 2009). The In re Marriage Cases court
reached a similar conclusion:
Both groups at issue consist of pairs of individuals who wish to enter into a formal, legally
binding and officially recognized, long-term family relationship that affords the same rights
and privileges and imposes the same obligations and responsibilities. Under these
circumstances, there is no question but that these two categories of individuals are sufficient
ly similar to bring into play equal protection principles that require a court to determine
“whether distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.”
183 P.3d at 435 n.54 (quoting People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 37 (Cal. 2006)). This was the same
analytical move employed by Justice Ginsburg in United States v. Virginia, although that opinion did
not use a “similarly situated” vocabulary. See 518 U.S. 515, 545 (1996). Quoting from VMI’s mission
statement regarding its goal of producing “citizen-soldiers,” Justice Ginsburg stated, “Surely that goal is
great enough to accommodate women.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Cahill, supra note 4
(noting that marriage equality opponents in California and Iowa had “tried to argue, again
unsuccessfully, that the ‘[same-sex couple] plaintiffs are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples
so as to necessitate further equal protection analysis because the plaintiffs cannot ‘procreate naturally.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882)).
143 Cf. MINOW, supra note 17, at 379 (arguing that “emphasiz[ing] the basic connectedness
between people and the injuries that result from social isolation and exclusion” would be “an opening
wedge for an alternative to traditional legal treatments of difference”).
138
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“SIMILARLY SITUATED” IN EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE

This Part describes the origins of the phrase “similarly situated” and
demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court has not historically viewed it as a
separate, threshold requirement, but rather as one and the same as the equal
protection merits inquiry. The phrase “similarly situated” appeared in equal
protection doctrine long before the current tiered analysis. Originally
imported from other doctrinal contexts, “similarly situated” has figured in
equal protection challenges since the latter half of the nineteenth century. 144
In the mid- to late-twentieth century civil rights era, “similarly situated”
played a particularly salient role in the early gender and legitimacy cases,
presaging the advent of an intermediate level of scrutiny145 and assisting
courts in separating stereotyped differences from legitimate bases of dis
tinction.146 Throughout all this time, it has never been viewed by the U.S.
Supreme Court as a threshold hurdle to obtaining equal protection review
on the merits.
A.

The Early Cases

Before entering the equal protection lexicon—even before the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment—the phrase “similarly situated” was used to
refer to property. The earliest cases involved the capture of ships in the War
of 1812.147 Other early cases centered on authority over land, 148 including
land grants in New Orleans in 1836149 and in California during the MexicanAmerican War.150 In other early cases, the phrase described the location of
144

See infra notes 147-81 and accompanying text.
See Gunther, supra note 20, at 32-33.
146 Cf. Engles, supra note 14, at 174 (“[T]he similarly-situated test . . . provides one means of
uncovering illicit motive.”).
147 See, e.g., The Adventure, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 221, 228 (1814) (“[A]s this property was found
within the United States at the declaration of war, it must stand on the same footing with other British
property similarly situated.”).
148 See, e.g., Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279, 290 (1877); Moore v. Am. Transp. Co., 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 1, 39 (1860) (“[C]ommerce upon these lakes, and all others similarly situated, is not within
the regulation of Congress.”); see also United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127, 144 (1850) (“The
character of this hypothesis requires particular examination, as upon its correctness or its fallacy must
depend the fate of this claim, and of every other similarly situated.”); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 498, 515 (1839).
149 See, e.g., Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 731 (1836) (“That both
the kings of France and Spain could exercise a certain jurisdiction over this common, and other places
similarly situated, has been stated . . . .”).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Cambuston, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 59, 64 (1857) (“The grant purporting
to have been made by Pico, so near the time when the Government of the Territory had passed from his
hands . . . it, and all others similarly situated, should be inquired into and scrutinized with great
care . . . .”).
145
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land,151 particularly in relationship to water.152 The phrase was used in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,153 in a section discussing whether Congress possessed
authority to pass legislation banning slavery in certain territories. 154
In the Civil War period, “similarly situated” appeared in cases involv
ing the Captured and Abandoned Property Act and the Non-Intercourse
Act, sometimes referring to the difficult circumstances in which people
found themselves in wartime. 155 In an 1869 case, it referred to the situation
of a Southern debtor.156 In another case, litigants described the
circumstances of agents assertedly authorized by Union Army officials to
run a blockade. 157
In the late-nineteenth century, the Court began to employ “similarly
situated” in reference to the application of a facially neutral statute to all
engaging in a particular activity. 158 An 1883 case rejecting a claim that a
ferry license fee constituted an unlawful restraint on the right to contract
explained:

151

See, e.g., Meehan v. Forsyth, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 175, 178 (1860) (noting that another case
“involved a controversy for a lot in the city of Peoria, similarly situated as that which forms the subject
of this suit” (citing Bryan v. Forsyth, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 334 (1856))).
152 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Dunne v. Econ. Light & Power Co., 234 U.S. 497, 515 (1914) (discuss
ing “other lands similarly situated with reference to the river”); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
164 U.S. 112, 163 (1896); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 515 (1887) (Clifford, J., concurring) (“Hundreds
of such creeks . . . are similarly situated.”); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 87 (1857)
(“[T]he flow of the waters of the Homochitto removes the deposits of mud occasioned by the overflow
of the Mississippi, and thus keeps open the outlet of Old river, to the great advantage of the
complainant, and of others similarly situated on Old river.”); Surgett v. Lapice, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 48, 66
(1850) (describing the construction of embankments on the Mississippi River, explaining that “individu
al proprietors were relied on to do that which, in other countries at all similarly situated, was a great
national work”); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 398 (1849) (“Hundreds of creeks within the
flow of the tide were similarly situated.”).
153 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend XIV.
154 Id. at 434 (“The example of Virginia was soon afterwards followed by other States, and, at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, all of the States, similarly situated, had ceded their
unappropriated lands, except North Carolina and Georgia.”).
155 See, e.g., United States v. Grossmayer, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 72, 74 (1869); The Sea Lion, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 630, 637 (1866).
156 Grossmayer, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 74 (“It was natural that Grossmayer should desire to be paid,
and creditable to Einstein to wish to discharge his obligation to him, but the same thing can be said of
very many persons who were similarly situated during the war . . . .”).
157 The Sea Lion, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 637 (stating that the agents who “[e]mbarked in a transaction
such as this” and “persons similarly situated” were “compelled . . . to pick their way in fear and silence,
walking, as it were, at every step, over burning ploughshares” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
158 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equality, 74 IND. L.J. 1085, 1087
(1999) (“The framers of the clause and the early Supreme Court decisions focused equal protection
attention on laws that subjected a class of citizens to special disabilities unjustified by natural
differences.”); see also Saunders, supra note 21, at 333.
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The ordinance of the city of East St. Louis makes no discrimination in favor of any other
ferry similarly situated which it is authorized to regulate, tax, and license. The same license
fee is exacted of all keepers of ferries within the corporate limits as are imposed upon the
plaintiff in error.159

B.

Barbier v. Connolly: Emergence in Equal Protection

The first use of the phrase “similarly situated” in U.S. Supreme Court
equal protection jurisprudence was in 1884 in Barbier v. Connolly.160
Barbier dealt with an ordinance passed by the board of supervisors of the
city and county of San Francisco regulating public laundries.161 The ordin
ance in Barbier was one of a series of facially neutral laws designed to
discriminate against Chinese laundrymen; at the time, more than threequarters of California laundrymen were Chinese, and animus against them
was running high. 162 The famous Yick Wo v. Hopkins decision was a subse
quent case in this series.163
Under the ordinance at issue in Barbier, public laundries were to
obtain a certificate from the city health officer and another from the fire
wardens, they were to stop washing and ironing clothes between 10:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m., and forbid any person with an infectious disease from
remaining on the premises. 164 The petitioner in Barbier was convicted of
washing and ironing clothes during the off-hours and was sentenced to the
county jail for five days.165
Mr. Barbier brought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the ordin
ance violated the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Specifically, he argued that the
ordinance discriminated between a “class of laborers engaged in the laundry
business” and those engaged in other businesses and “that it discriminated
between laborers beyond the designated limits and those within them.”167
The lower court dismissed the writ, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
concluding that there was no “invidious discrimination.”168 The challenged
159

Wiggins Ferry Co. v. E. St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365 (1883) (challenging a ferry licensing fee
imposed by the City of St. Louis on the grounds that it supposedly impaired the right of contract).
160 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
161 Id. at 27.
162 Bernstein, supra note 23, at 228-29.
163 Bernstein, supra note 23, at 244. But see Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race:
Doubts About Yick Wo, U. I LL. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (2008) (arguing that Yick Wo is really based in due
process, not equal protection, and is not so much a victory for antidiscrimination principles as a routine
application of treaty law).
164 Barbier, 113 U.S. at 27-28.
165 Id. at 28-29. In fact, Professor David Bernstein’s article reveals that Barbier was a test case set
up to demonstrate the law’s constitutionality by the lawyers for the City of San Francisco, but that fact
apparently did not come to light in the Supreme Court. Bernstein, supra note 23, at 234-35.
166 Barbier, 113 U.S. at 29.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 29-30, 32.
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legislation did not discriminate, the Court explained, but applied to “[a]ll
persons engaged in the same business.”169 The Equal Protection Clause does
not prohibit regulation imposed “alike upon all persons and property under
the same circumstances and conditions,” the Court explained,170 but rather
forbids “[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some and favoring
others.”171 In its next sentence, the Court introduced the phrase “similarly
situated” into equal protection analysis: “[L]egislation which, in carrying
out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its
operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the
amendment.”172
Some commentators argue that Barbier’s statement that “[c]lass legis
lation . . . is prohibited, but [not] legislation which . . . affects alike all
persons similarly situated”173 reflected the understanding of the drafters of
the Equal Protection Clause that it was “designed to prevent the states from
singling out certain classes of people for special benefits or burdens without
sufficient justification.”174 This conception of equal protection, they assert,
was rooted in nineteenth-century state constitutional doctrines that forbade
“partial” or “special laws,” imposing benefits or burdens on a class of
persons without an adequate “public purpose.”175
Certainly, despite its emphasis on facial neutrality, Barbier is a case
that is deeply enmeshed in racist and anti-immigrant sentiment; 176
emphasizing that the statute at issue was facially neutral was certainly not a
race-neutral act.177 However, the phrase “similarly situated” is employed to
169

Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 32.
171 Id.
172 Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
173 Id.
174 Saunders, supra note 21, at 333.
175 Id. at 247-48 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also HOWARD GILMAN, T HE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 7 (1993) (stating that “nineteenth-century courts were on guard against not all
regulations of the economy but only a particular kind of government interference in market relations—
what the justices considered ‘class’ or ‘partial’ legislation; that is, laws that (from their point of view)
promoted only the narrow interests of particular groups or classes rather than the general welfare.”);
David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 13, 15 (2003) (explaining that “[o]pposition to class legislation had
deep roots in pre-Civil War American thought and, after the Civil War, quickly became an interpretive
focal point of the Fourteenth Amendment,” although arguing that “[c]lass [l]egislation [a]nalysis [d]id
[n]ot [p]lay an [i]nfluential [r]ole in the Lochner [e]ra”); Lawrence Schlam, Equality in Culture and
Law: An Introduction to the Origins and Evolution of the Equal Protection Principle, 24 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 425, 429-30, 434 (2004) (“Perhaps the most complete body of early ‘equal protection’ law in state
courts dealt with ‘partial’ or special laws. State courts repeatedly invalidated laws that singled out a
particular class or person as the recipient of special rights or the carrier of extra burdens.” (footnote
omitted)).
176 See Bernstein, supra note 23, at 231.
177 See id. at 231-33.
170

602

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 18:3

express that equal protection concerns itself with distinctions between
classes of persons.178
In the famous follow-on case to Barbier, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which
established the viability of equal protection challenges based on discrimina
tory enforcement, the Court repeated its use of the phrase “similarly
situated,” citing Barbier.179 Contrasting the situation in Yick Wo with the
statute in Barbier, the Court explained that “[t]he ordinance drawn in ques
tion in the present case . . . does not prescribe a rule and conditions for the
regulation of the use of property for laundry purposes, to which all similarly
situated may conform.”180
C.

The Lochner Era: Increasing Focus on “Fit”

Through the late-nineteenth century and into the Lochner era, the
phrase “similarly situated” appeared in cases involving equal protection
challenges to statutes. During this period, courts first cited the phrase as
part of Barbier’s statement that equal protection forbade “class legislation”
and then increasingly mentioned “similarly situated” in connection with the
“fit” between the legislative classification and statutory purpose. Whether
judges deferred to legislatures or adopted a more searching attitude towards
social and economic regulation, they uniformly treated “similarly situated”
as part of the merits phase of equal protection review, not as a threshold
inquiry.
The Barbier “similarly situated” formulation, emphasizing the bar on
“class legislation,” was cited numerous times during the Lochner era.181

178

See id. at 211 (“These laws almost never discriminated against the Chinese explicitly. Neverthe
less, such laws were passed in order to shut down Chinese laundries.”). Bernstein argues the “revision
ist” view of the Lochner era—that is, that courts “relied on two long-standing American intellectual
traditions . . . the tradition that valued ‘natural rights’ and ‘free labor,’ and the tradition that ‘opposed
class legislation.’” Id. at 282-83 (footnote omitted).
179 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367-68 (1886) (citing Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31
32 (1885)).
180 Id. at 368.
181 Professor Stephen Siegel has argued that Lochner-era courts’ reliance on equal protection to
invalidate state protective legislation has been under-estimated. See Stephen A. Siegel, Justice Holmes,
Buck v. Bell, and the History of Equal Protection, 90 MINN. L. REV. 106, 131-32 (2005) (arguing that
“[d]espite the conventional wisdom” that Lochner-era courts relied on due process to invalidate state
protective legislation, “the number of equal protection invalidations is surprisingly large,” numbering
forty-six invalidations on equal protection grounds between 1897 and 1937, “approximately one-fifth of
the total number of decisions in which the Lochner-era Court voided governmental action on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds”); see also Bernstein, supra note 23, at 214 (arguing the “revisionist” view of the
Lochner era, which focuses on “negative effects of facially neutral regulatory legislation on racial
minorities”). But see Bernstein, supra note 175, at 28 (arguing that “[c]lass [l]egislation [a]nalysis [d]id
[n]ot [p]lay an [i]nfluential [r]ole in the Lochner [e]ra” and that “[w]hen the Lochner Court did
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Invalidating a Kansas statute regulating stockyards, the Court in Cotting v.
Kansas City Stock Yards Co.182 nonetheless recognized that “exercising the
undoubted right of classification it may often happen that some classes are
subjected to regulations, and some individuals are . . . similarly situated.” 183
In 1921, the Court invalidated an Arizona statute protecting picketers,
reasoning that it violated equal protection and due process, and quoted
Barbier.184
Lochner-era dissenters also appealed to formulations of “similarly
situated” language in defending the regulatory power of the state. 185 They
too integrated “similarly situated” in their equal protection analysis,
focusing increasingly on the relationship between the classification and the
statute’s purpose. 186 Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Quaker City Cab Co. v.
invalidate regulatory legislation, it consistently relied on liberty of contract arguments under the Due
Process Clause rather than on class legislation arguments under the Equal Protection Clause”).
182 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
183 Id. at 111-12.
184 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333-34 (1921).
185 See, e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 42 n.1 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
186 Not all Lochner-era cases employing the phrase “similarly situated” invalidated statutes on
equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 228, 239, 246
(1917) (upholding a Washington statute requiring logging companies to contribute to a state fund and
explaining that “[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but
legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its
operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404, 413 (1915) (denying relief in a 1915 habeas
case challenging a conviction under a Los Angeles city ordinance restricting brick making to certain
parts of the city, reasoning that “[i]t may be that brick yards in other localities within the city where the
same conditions exist are not regulated or prohibited, but it does not follow that they will not be”);
Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 174-75, 179-80 (1910) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a
statute criminalizing practicing medicine without a license, stating that “[t]he selection of the exempted
classes was within the legislative power, subject only to the restriction that it be not arbitrary or oppres
sive and apply equally to all persons similarly situated”); Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79, 86, 90
(1910) (affirming an Arkansas conviction for “drumming” up customers for a boarding house on a
railway depot, explaining that “[i]t is settled that legislation which ‘in carrying out a public purpose is
limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly
situated, is not within the amendment’” (quoting Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885))); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418, 423 (1908) (upholding a statute limiting the hours that women could
work in a laundry and, in so doing, rejecting the defendant’s claim that the statute was impermissible
class legislation that “d[id] not apply equally to all persons similarly situated”); New York ex rel.
Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 557, 559, 563 (1905) (affirming a conviction under a New
York statute that criminalized selling milk without a license, the Court quoted the New York Appellate
Division opinion that “if this section of the sanitary code vested in [the board] arbitrary power to license
one dealer . . . and refuse a license to another similarly situated, undoubtedly it would be invalid” (quot
ing New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 80 N.Y.S. 1108 (App. Div. 1903))). Some opinions
still used “similarly situated” to refer to a geographic location. In other opinions, it referred to a person’s
circumstances or a geographic location. The Court rejected a challenge to a New Mexico statute forbid
ding railways to accept cattle hides for shipment outside of the territory without proof of inspection. See

604

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 18:3

Pennsylvania,187 defended a statute imposing taxes on a transportation com
pany and explained that “we have declared that the classification must rest
upon a difference which is real . . . so that all actually situated similarly will
be treated alike . . . . Subject to this limitation of reasonableness, the equali
ty clause has left unimpaired . . . the State’s power to classify for purposes
of taxation.”188
Some of the Lochner-era opinions contained language that would later
be important in civil rights victories. 189 These opinions used the “similarly
situated” concept in a more rigorous form of rational basis review, 190 strik
ing down economic and public welfare legislation. The Court’s 1920 deci
sion in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia191 elaborated on the “similarly
situated” requirement, using language that would be cited later by the
Supreme Court in anti-discrimination cases.192 At issue in Royster was an
income tax that exempted businesses that were incorporated in Virginia, but
did all of their business outside of the commonwealth.193 Equal protection
does not forbid state legislatures from classifying, the Court explained,
“[b]ut the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.”194 The Court concluded that the exemption in Royster
New Mexico ex rel. E.J. McLean & Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 38, 54-55 (1906)
(“In the Territory of New Mexico, and other parts of the country similarly situated, it is highly essential
to protect large numbers of people against criminal aggression upon this class of property.”).
187 277 U.S. 389 (1928), abrogated by Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co, 410 U.S. 356
(1973).
188 Id. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
189 Cf. Bernstein, supra note 175, at 13, 31-32, 49 (describing an “expansion of Lochnerian due
process jurisprudence to civil liberties” in the 1920s, although emphasizing that this legacy was
grounded in due process, not equal protection); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering
and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 273 (2005) (arguing that post-Civil War
African-American advocates shared “the same set of concerns that produced the new judicial doctrines
of the Lochner era: that states would rely on the police power . . . in ways that overstepped constitutional
bounds”); Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609, 609-10
(2011) (arguing that a “modified Lochnerian analysis, based on the presumption that people should be
allowed the liberty to order their own affairs,” might “advance gay rights”).
190 See Schlam, supra note 175 at 439 (describing how the Court in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), “articulated a modified, more demanding version of the ‘rational
basis’ standard of review”); see also Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test
and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 361 (2006) (“Tracing back to Gilded Age Commerce
Clause adjudication, and frequently used in Lochner-era police power cases, the ‘narrow tailoring’
doctrine gave meaningful protection to constitutional norms well before the development of either
modern bifurcated review or strict scrutiny.”).
191 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
192 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (citing Royster in a gender discrimination
case).
193 Royster, 253 U.S. at 414.
194 Id. at 415.
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violated equal protection because “the ground of difference upon which the
discrimination is rested has no fair or substantial relation to the proper
object sought to be accomplished by the legislation.”195
In 1927, Justice Holmes elaborated on “similarly situated” in his re
viled opinion in Buck v. Bell,196 upholding a statute authorizing sterilization
of the “feeble-minded”197 and deriding the Equal Protection Clause as “the
usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”198 Although more deferential
to the legislature than Royster, Holmes’s opinion also focused on the rela
tionship between classification and legislative policy. He wrote that “the
law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy,
applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all simi
larly situated so far and so fast as its means allow.”199 Language from Buck
was later cited in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,200 but in that
case, the Court reached a different conclusion by invalidating Oklahoma’s
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act and concluding that “[m]arriage and
procreation” were, in fact, “one of the basic civil rights of man.”201
Although the 1940 case Tigner v. Texas202 did not use the phrase “simi
larly situated,” its analysis later figured in interpretations of the phrase,
particularly in cases rejecting gender discrimination claims.203 Although
exemplifying a more deferential statement of rational basis review, Tigner
again articulated a “fit” inquiry in which the concept “similarly situated” is
part of an integrated analysis.204 In Tigner, the Court rejected an equal pro
tection challenge to a price-fixing statute, which the plaintiff claimed
violated equal protection by differentiating between agriculture and
industry.205 “The equality at which the ‘equal protection’ clause aims is not
a disembodied equality,” the Court explained. 206 It continued:
The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins “the equal protection of the laws,” and laws are not ab
stract propositions. They do not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of
policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the

195

Id. at 416-17.
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
197 Siegel, supra note 181, at 116; see also id. at 106 (describing Buck v. Bell as Justice Holmes’s
“most despised opinion”).
198 Bell, 274 U.S. at 208.
199 Id.
200 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
201 Id. at 541.
202 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
203 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
204 Tigner, 310 U.S. at 147.
205 Id. at 144, 149.
206 Id. at 147.
196
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use of specific remedies. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact
or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.207

D.

“Similarly Situated” and the Advent of Intermediate Scrutiny

The phrase “similarly situated” figures prominently in relatively few
race discrimination cases of the mid-twentieth century civil rights era.208
Beginning in the 1970s, however, a growing number of equal protection
opinions, particularly in gender discrimination cases, employed the phrase
“similarly situated.”209
1.

The Gender Discrimination Cases

Numerous cases used the phrase “similarly situated” in concluding that
the legislative classification was based on outmoded gender stereotypes. 210
207

Id.
The phrase “similarly situated” appeared in a series of equal protection challenges to legislative
reapportionment beginning with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1962). See Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S. 695, 697-98 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 680 (1964); Md. Comm. for Fair Represen
tation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 659 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 635-36 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537, 540 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1964); see also
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 779-80 (1984) (using “similarly situated” in the description of the class);
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 559 (1974) (describing how “plaintiffs, or any other
Negroes similarly situated, [were forced] to submit to enforced segregation solely because of race or
color in their use of any public parks”). As discussed further, infra, “similarly situated” played an im
portant role in alienage cases, including Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). See infra notes 256-58
and accompanying text; cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 687 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“Every grantee similarly situated is saddled by the identical burden imposed on Fred Oyama whether
he is the son of a Japanese, the son of an American citizen or the son of an eligible alien.”).
209 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 611 (1979) (White, J., dissenting)
(“Such an arbitrary assignment of burdens among classes that are similarly situated with respect to the
proffered objectives is the type of invidious choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.”); Ill.
State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 176-77 (1979) (noting “the incongruous
result that a new party or an independent candidate needs substantially more signatures to gain access to
the ballot than a similarly situated party or candidate for statewide office”); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Mar
tinez, 436 U.S. 49, 53 (1978) (stating that plaintiffs filed suit “on behalf of themselves and others simi
larly situated”); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 522 (1977) (per curiam) (stating that plaintiff alleged “it
was constitutionally impermissible that indigent women be ‘subjected to State coercion to bear children
which they do not wish to bear [while] no other women similarly situated are so coerced.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omit
ted)); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 88 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But
see Engles, supra note 14, at 154 (arguing that some of the Court’s then-recent gender cases went
beyond the “similarly situated” test by focusing on the relationship between classification and statutory
purpose and in fact required “a good reason for not treating men and women identically”).
210 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982) (noting that “[a]
similarly situated female would not have been required to choose between forgoing credit and bearing
208
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Many of these opinions were issued during the period in which the Court
was feeling its way toward an intermediate level of scrutiny for gender
discrimination claims. 211 In these cases, the Court used “similarly situated”
to emphasize the importance of scrutinizing legislative classifications based
on gender to determine if they reflected a difference that should be
accorded the force of law.
For example, the Court cited Royster in Stanton v. Stanton212 in
striking down a Utah child support statute that provided different ages of
majority for male and female children, affecting how long they would
receive child support.213 The Stanton court quoted Royster’s statement that
“[a] classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.”214 Although the State of Utah asserted that sons would be
more likely than daughters to require extended support for higher educa
tion, the Court wrote that there was “nothing rational in the distinction” 215
and that the “criteria [of gender was] wholly unrelated to the objective of
that statute.”216
In striking down an Idaho statute giving a preference to males in the
appointment of administrators of estates in Reed v. Reed,217 the Court cited
Barbier and Royster and wrote:

th[e] inconvenience” of travelling to another city to attend a nursing program); Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 149 (1980) (invalidating a statute providing gender-based disparity in
survivor’s benefits and saying “[i]t was this discrimination against the male survivor as compared with a
similarly situated female that . . .result[ed] in a denial of equal protection”); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
270-71 (1979) (invalidating an Alabama alimony statute under which men, but not women, could be
ordered to pay, stating that “Mr. Orr made no claim that he was entitled to an award of alimony from
Mrs. Orr, but only that he should not be required to pay alimony if similarly situated wives could not be
ordered to pay”); cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he
effect of the Court’s decision in this case is not to require Wisconsin to draw its legislative classifica
tions with greater precision or to afford similar treatment to similarly situated persons.”).
211 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 485 n.17 (“Some have argued that the Court had actually been
applying a form of heightened review since Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).”); Gunther, supra note
20, at 32-34; see also Farrell, supra note 16, at 358-70 (describing Professor Gunther’s article identify
ing the emerging form of heightened scrutiny).
212 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
213 Id. at 8, 17.
214 Id. at 14 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
215 Id.
216 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 14-15 (“No longer is the female destined
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of
ideas.”).
217 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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The objective of [the statute] clearly is to establish degrees of entitlement of various classes
of persons in accordance with their varying degrees and kinds of relationship to the intestate.
Regardless of their sex, persons within any one of the enumerated classes of that section are
similarly situated with respect to that objective.218

In Eisenstadt v. Baird,219 the Court invalidated Massachusetts statutes
prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons and explained
that “by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons
who are similarly situated, [the statutes] violate the Equal Protection
Clause.”220 Concluding that a statute violated equal protection if it treated
the spouses of male and female service members differently for the purpose
of benefits, the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson221 explained that “any
statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the
purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands
‘dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated.” 222
In Califano v. Goldfarb,223 it concluded that a provision of the Social
Security Act providing survivors’ benefits to widows but not widowers
“disadvantages women contributors to the social security system as
compared to similarly situated men.”224
2.

“Different in Fact”: Childbearing and the Draft

The “similarly situated” language figured prominently, often with
different results, in equal protection cases involving pregnancy, childbear
ing, and the draft.225 Although in these cases the Court sometimes described
218 Id. at 77; see also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Reed, 404 U.S. 71).
219 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
220 Id. at 454-55.
221 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
222 Id. at 688, 690 (alteration in original).
223 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
224 Id. at 201-02, 208. Likewise, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Court used the phrase “similarly
situated” in invalidating a provision of the Social Security Act that provided benefits to wives of
deceased fathers, but not to widowers. 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975). It explained that the decedent, who had
worked as a teacher and died in childbirth, “not only failed to receive for her family the same protection
which a similarly situated male worker would have received, but she also was deprived of a portion of
her own earnings.” Id. at 639, 645.
225 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case
Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 761 (2002) (noting that the Supreme
Court has often struck down legal classifications based on sex stereotypes, “with the exceptions
generally tending to cluster around sex-specific rules that the Court understands to be inseparably tied to
the gestational capacity that all women (presumptively) possess”); cf. William D. Araiza, New Groups
and Old Doctrine: Rethinking Congressional Power to Enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 37 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 451, 473 (2010) (pointing out that sexual orientation classifications are more frequently
upheld under rational basis review in cases involving the military and child-rearing).
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men and women as not “similarly situated” because of differences it
deemed salient, the Court employed “similarly situated” analysis as part of
its equal protection review, not as a threshold analysis.
In Michael M. v. Superior Court,226 the Court upheld a statutory rape
law imposing criminal penalties on men but not women. 227 Quoting Tigner
for the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause does not require
“‘things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they
were the same,’” Justice Rehnquist wrote, “the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances.”228 The Michael M. majority concluded
that it was reasonable for the legislature to impose a criminal penalty only
on men. 229 The legislative aim was to deter pregnancies outside of marriage,
the Court reasoned, and young women already bore the brunt of the harm of
teen pregnancy.230
“Similarly situated” analysis appeared again with mixed results in
cases regarding children born outside of marriage. 231 In Caban v.
Mohammed,232 the Court struck down a New York law requiring the consent
of unwed mothers (but not unwed fathers) to the adoption of their children,
concluding that men and women were similarly situated with respect to the
legislative purpose. 233 Citing Reed and Royster, it explained that a statute
“must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circums
tanced shall be treated alike.”234 In Caban, the father had participated in
raising the children over a period of years, and the Court concluded that
there was no “profound difference between the affection and concern of
mothers and fathers for their children” under these circumstances.235
That same year, however, in Parham v. Hughes, 236 the Court upheld a
Georgia statute that permitted the mothers of children born outside of
marriage to sue for wrongful death of their child, while the fathers of
extramarital children could only sue if they had “legitimated” their child. 237
“The fact is that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similar

226

450 U.S. 464 (1981).
Id. at 466-67.
228 Id. at 469 (alteration in original) (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966)).
229 Id. at 472-73.
230 Id.
231 See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503 (1976) (“The [Social Security] Secretary does
not disagree that the Lucas children and others similarly circumstanced are treated differently, as a
class . . . .”).
232 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
233 Id. at 391-92.
234 Id. at 391 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
235 Id. at 382-83, 392.
236 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
237 Id. at 348-49, 359.
227
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ly situated,” the Court explained. 238 “Unlike the mother of an illegitimate
child whose identity will rarely be in doubt, the identity of the father will
frequently be unknown.”239 Four years after Parham, Lehr v. Robertson240
presented a case where the father had never established a relationship with
his child, and the Court concluded that equal protection was not violated by
a statute that permitted the adoption to proceed without giving him notice. 241
In this case, the Court reasoned, mothers and fathers were not “in fact
similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child.”242
The Court again focused on men’s and women’s purportedly different
relationship to childbearing in more recent cases involving requirements for
foreign-born children born outside of marriage to claim U.S. citizenship. 243
The Court upheld more onerous requirements for the children of U.S.
citizen fathers than for children of U.S. citizen mothers.244 Citing Royster
and Cleburne, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Tuan Anh Nguyen
v. INS,245 said that “[f]athers and mothers are not similarly situated with
regard to the proof of biological parenthood.”246
The other major area in which the Court has concluded that women
and men sometimes are not “similarly situated” is military service. 247 In
Schlesinger v. Ballard,248 the Court upheld a statute providing that male
naval officers would face mandatory discharge if they were passed over for
promotion twice, while female officers had 13 years before facing
mandatory discharge.249 The Court reasoned that “the different treatment of
men and women naval officers . . . reflects, not archaic and overbroad
generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and female
line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to
opportunities for professional service.”250 Specifically, the Court explained,
238
239
240
241
242
243

Id. at 355.
Id.
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Id. at 267-68.
Id. at 267.
See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420

(1998).
244

Tuan Anh Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
533 U.S. 53 (2001).
246 Id. at 63.
247 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 878 n.20 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I would protest the extension of this gender classification into the area of
federal education assistance, an area in which gender is irrelevant and any classification based on gender
is constitutionally objectionable. Men and women are similarly situated for purposes of the allocation of
education funds.”); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 385-86 (1974) (upholding the exclusion of
conscientious objectors from financial aid for veterans); see also Engles, supra note 14, at 173 (noting
“the Court’s highly deferential attitude toward congressional decisions in the military area”).
248 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
249 Id. at 502-04, 508-10.
250 Id. at 508.
245
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women had less opportunity for promotion, since there were restrictions on
their participation in combat and sea duty.251
In 1981, the Court rejected a due process challenge to the draft, again
reasoning that men and women were not “similarly situated.”252 “Men and
women, because of the combat restrictions on women, are simply not
similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft,” wrote
Justice Rehnquist in his opinion for the Court.253 “The Constitution requires
that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly,” he continued, “not
that it engage in gestures of superficial equality.”254
E.

“All Persons Similarly Situated Should Be Treated Alike”

The phrase “similarly situated” continued to appear in the Court’s
opinions when it began to use a tiered approach to equal protection
analysis.255 However, instead of employing “similarly situated” as an
antecedent requirement to the tiered review, the Court used it to restate the
core principles of the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry.
In Plyler v. Doe, 256 which concluded that denying undocumented
children a public school education did not pass rational basis review, Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, said that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause
directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’” 257
“But so too, ‘[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.’”258
Perhaps the most-cited language regarding “similarly situated”
analysis in current equal protection jurisprudence is from the Court’s 1985
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,259 in which it
declined to consider “mental retardation” a quasi-suspect class, but none
theless struck down a statute requiring a “special use” permit for a group
home. 260 The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, described the three

251

Id.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981).
253 Id.
254 Id. at 79.
255 Cf. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 485 & n.16 (stating that the Supreme Court started articulating
“detailed indicia for discerning which classifications should fill” the set of tiers in equal protection
analysis in the early 1970s and citing cases that use the phrase “similarly situated” (citing Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (plurality opinion); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))).
256 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
257 Id. at 216 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
258 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
259 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
260 Id. at 446-48.
252
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levels of review in modern equal protection analysis.261 However, citing
Plyler, the Cleburne Court also used “similarly situated” in describing the
overarching concerns of equal protection, writing that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is essentially a direction that all per
sons similarly situated should be treated alike.”262 Although not particularly
substantive, this oft-cited statement makes clear that “similarly situated” is
a restatement of the central aims of equal protection.
F.

Summing Up Lessons of the Historical Survey

In the early equal protection cases like Barbier, the “similarly
situated” requirement meant that the legislation passed muster if it was non
discriminatory and neutral (as opposed to invidious “class legislation”) and
applied to all “similarly situated” with respect to the law. 263 For example, in
passing on the facially neutral restriction of laundry hours, the Barbier
court explained that legislation does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
if “within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly
situated.”264
As equal protection doctrine evolved, it focused increasingly on the
“fit” between classification and legislative purpose. 265 In the 1920 Virginia
tax case Royster,266 the Court emphasized the need for this “fit,” using the
language of the similarly situated requirement: “the classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”267 Watershed
cases like Cleburne and Plyler also emphasize that “fit” is the overarching
purpose of equal protection analysis, 268 again employing “similarly
situated.”269 In Cleburne, the Court wrote that the “command[]” of the
261

Id. at 439-42.
Id. at 439.
263 See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
264 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
265 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 17, at 345-46 (describing the fit between the “classifying
trait” and the legislative purpose (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Araiza, Constitutional
Rules, supra note 14 (describing a “concern with ‘fit’ analysis in traditional equal protection doctrine”).
266 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 515 n.126 (citing Royster as an example of “strong” rational basis
review (internal quotation marks omitted)).
267 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); see also Goldberg, supra note
20, at 515.
268 See Araiza, Constitutional Rules, supra note 14 (observing that the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998), “reflect[ed] a concern with ‘fit’
analysis in traditional equal protection doctrine”).
269 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.’” (quoting Royster, 253 U.S. at 415)).
262
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Equal Protection Clause is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.”270
“Similarly situated” analysis appears in four of the twelve rational
basis cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a legislative
classification between 1973 and 2010 271—Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Commission,272 Cleburne, Williams v. Vermont,273 and Plyler. It also
figures in the “class-of-one” equal protection cases.274
This “similarly situated” language appears not only in rational basis
cases, but also figures prominently in the early gender discrimination cases,
such as Reed and Eisenstadt.275 In the early gender cases, the Court is con
cerned with which differences are deemed “real”—mostly related to child
bearing and combat service—and which are either outmoded stereotypes or
generalizations that may be statistically true at the moment, but should not
be reified. 276 “Similarly situated” figures so prominently in these cases

270

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216).
See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 346 (1989); Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 439; Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 23 (1985); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. Goldberg’s 2004
article collected the cases in which the Court invalidated a statutory classification under rational basis
review, taking 1973—the year of Gunther’s article—as the starting point. See Goldberg, supra note 20,
at 512-13, 513 n.120. The review contained in this Article has not identified any subsequent “rational
basis with bite” invalidations at the Supreme Court level. See also Farrell, supra note 16 (concluding
that there are “effectively . . . two sets of rationality cases, one deferential and one heightened, operating
as if in parallel universes with no connection between them”).
272 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
273 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
274 See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Araiza, Constitu
tional Rules, supra note 14, at 56-57; Araiza, Irrationality and Animus, supra note 14, at 503. Compare
Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564 (“Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought
by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”), with
Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 604-05 (2008) (concluding that there is no viable
“class of one” equal protection claim in public employment).
275 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
276 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (describing Supreme Court equal
protection jurisprudence as rejecting “generalizations about ‘the way women are’”). Compare Wengler
v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980) (concluding that there is no real difference be
tween widows and widowers), Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1979) (finding that there is no differ
ence between “needy” men and women for the receipt of alimony payments), Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977) (determining that there is no real difference between widows and widowers in
the receipt of social welfare), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652-53 (1975) (indicating that
awarding dependent benefits does not implicate problems “special” only to women), Frontiero v. Rich
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91, 691 n.25 (1973) (holding that there is no real difference between men and
women armed forces members for the purpose of awarding various benefits), Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at
453 (indicating that there is no difference between married and unmarried persons in the distribution of
contraceptives), and Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77 (concluding that there is no difference in the abilities of
men and women to administer an estate of a person who dies intestate), with Nguyen v INS, 533 U.S.
53, 73 (2001) (finding that there is a difference between men and women in the birth process), and
271
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because it presages appearance of intermediate scrutiny.277 In those cases,
the Court was trying to use the “similarly situated” analysis to filter real
differences from stereotypes.278
It is not surprising that “similarly situated” is pivotal in cases
involving either rational basis or intermediate scrutiny. Under the current
tiered structure, these levels of scrutiny are particularly concerned with the
link between the legislative line-drawing and statutory purpose, 279 and with
sorting legitimate from illegitimate bases of classification.280
By contrast, the phrase “similarly situated” did not figure as promi
nently in race cases that were reviewed under strict scrutiny. 281 The phrase
appeared only in passing in Brown v. Board of Education282 and did not
appear in Loving v. Virginia283 or in Washington v. Davis.284 More recently,
there is no mention of the words “similarly situated” in Johnson v.
California,285 which concluded that the California Department of Correc
tion’s policy of temporary racial segregation upon admission was subject to
strict scrutiny.286 There is no substantive “similarly situated” analysis in the
Court’s 2003 higher education affirmative action cases, Grutter v.
Bollinger287 and Gratz v. Bollinger,288 nor in the recent school desegregation
case Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1.289 The phrase “similarly situated” appears less in race cases because the
Court is less willing to entertain the claim that racial line-drawing is legiti
mate, no matter the asserted justification.290 The absence of “similarly

Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (determining that men and women are not
similarly situated with respect to the risks associated with sexual intercourse).
277 See Goldberg, supra note 20, at 513 n.120; Gunther, supra note 20, at 32-33; see also Stanton
v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) (“We therefore conclude that under any test—compelling state
interest, or rational basis, or something in between—[the Utah age of majority statute applied in the
child support context] does not survive an equal protection attack.”).
278 Cf. Gunther, supra note 20, at 32-33.
279 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 540 (stating that “the core concerns of rational basis and heightened
review overlap in certain important respects”).
280 See Engles, supra note 14, at 154, 174-75.
281 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.10, 495 (1954) (using the phrase only in a
footnote and in the penultimate paragraph of the opinion).
282 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
283 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
284 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
285 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
286 Id. at 509.
287 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
288 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
289 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
290 See Engles, supra note 14, at 175 n. 152 (noting that the “presumption of validity [is] removed
where classification is based on race); Goldberg, supra note 20, at 509 (“[It] is possible that this rigid
and categorical review flows not just from the suspect classification analysis itself, but also from the
majority’s belief in the perniciousness of any racial classification.”).
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situated” talk is one more indicator of Professor Gerald Gunther’s famous
observation that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”291
As discussed in Part I, in some lower court cases, “similarly situated”
is used today as a threshold requirement, which must be satisfied in order to
merit full equal protection review.292 The court first determines whether the
parties are “similarly situated” before proceeding to the “fit” analysis,
applying the appropriate level of scrutiny under the tiered framework.293
However, properly understood, “similarly situated” analysis is
relational. Its focus is not merely pointing out any difference between the
two classes, but rather evaluating the relationship between the classification
and the statutory purpose. 294 As Justice Kennedy explained in Romer,
without using a “similarly situated” vocabulary, “[t]he search for the link
between classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection
Clause; it provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is
entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the limits of
our own authority.”295
III. THE SOLUTION: AN INTEGRATED “SIMILARLY SITUATED” ANALYSIS
As demonstrated in Part II, “similarly situated” emerges from the older
conception of equal protection as a bar on “class legislation,”296 a concern
that remains a focus of equal protection analysis, no matter the level of
scrutiny.297 This Part further develops the argument that “similarly situated”
is properly understood as one and the same as the substantive equal
protection review, and not as a threshold inquiry.
Under the Court’s current tiered scheme, when properly understood
and applied, “similarly situated” is another way of stating the fundamental
values of the Equal Protection Clause. 298 It is largely a restatement of
291 Gunther, supra note 20, at 8; see Schlam, supra note 175, at 446 (“If the Court categorized the
case as appropriate for strict scrutiny, the government almost always lost; if the traditional test was to be
used, the government almost never lost.”).
292 See supra notes 70-143 and accompanying text.
293 See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
294 ROTUNDA & N OWAK, supra note 60; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 17.
295 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); see also Goldberg, supra note 20, at 516 (quoting
this language from Romer as a statement of the “underlying purpose of equal protection review”).
296 See supra notes 160-80 and accompanying text. Thanks to Bill Araiza, Howard Wasserman,
and others with whom I workshopped this paper at Brooklyn Law School for helping to clarify my
thinking in this Section.
297 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 528.
298 This Article is not suggesting that the equal protection analysis itself is empty, contra Peter
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982), but rather that “similarly
situated” is another way of expressing the principles embodied in the current “tiered” review. Cf. Araiza,
supra note 225, at 508 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause, and the comprehensive equality principle that it
has been taken to mean, is known for its vacuity and indeterminacy.”).
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“rational basis with bite”299 and of intermediate scrutiny. Of course, these
two levels of scrutiny specify different degrees of “fit” that are required. 300
At both levels of review, however, “similarly situated” analysis is some
what redundant of the “fit” inquiry301—for rational basis, whether the line
that is drawn is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest, 302
and for intermediate scrutiny, whether it is substantially related to an impor
tant government interest.303 “Similarly situated” analysis underlies both of
these inquiries and, as a formal matter, can be collapsed into each of
them. 304 To borrow a phrase from the Iowa Supreme Court in Varnum,
“similarly situated” analysis should be “infused with principles traditionally
applied in the complete equal protection analysis.”305
This Part provides examples of the proper application of “similarly
situated.” It examines two Supreme Court cases that have conducted an
integrated “similarly situated” analysis and an opinion from a recent district
court case analyzing a challenge to the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”). It then applies these lessons to a case out of Iowa cited by the
Varnum court, Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc.,306 to illustrate how an integrated
“similarly situated” analysis might make a difference.
A.

Williams v. Vermont

A good example of a proper application of “similarly situated” appears
in Williams v. Vermont, a 1985 case that challenged a Vermont “use” tax
imposed on cars registered by owners who purchased them out-of-state
before becoming Vermont residents. 307 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
White, first identified the purpose of the Vermont Motor Vehicle Purchase
and Use Tax—to “improve and maintain” the roads.308 It then considered
whether the classification drawn—whether the taxpayer was a Vermont
resident at the time she purchased a vehicle and paid a sales tax in another
299

Smith, supra note 65, at 2770 (internal quotation marks omitted); Pettinga, supra note 65,

at 780.
300 “Similarly situated” analysis is not wholly redundant of the tiered approach because the level of
scrutiny applied instructs courts about “how likely it is that improper motives are behind the statute.”
Engles, supra note 14, at 174 (describing the difference between levels of scrutiny as “[h]ow ‘tight’ a fit
is required” between classification and statutory purpose).
301 See Araiza, Constitutional Rules, supra note 14; Araiza, Irrationality and Animus, supra
note 14, at 503, 505.
302 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
303 Id. at 440-41; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (explaining intermediate
scrutiny in the context of a gender classification case).
304 See supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
305 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 884 n.9 (Iowa 2009).
306 643 N.W.2d 200 (Iowa 2002).
307 Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1985).
308 Id. at 18 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 8901 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011]

SIMILARLY SITUATED

617

state—bore a rational relationship to the statutory purpose. 309 The Court
analyzed whether the two classes of Vermont residents were “similarly
situated” with respect to the legislative aim. 310 Apart from the classifying
trait (i.e., whether they were residents of Vermont at the time they
purchased their vehicle out-of-state), both groups were “similarly situated
for all relevant purposes.”311 Individuals in both groups were currently
Vermont residents, used a car in Vermont, and possessed “an equal obliga
tion to pay for the maintenance and improvement of Vermont’s roads.” 312
Thus, the Court concluded that “[t]he purposes of the statute would be iden
tically served, and with an identical burden, by taxing each” and that “[t]he
distinction between them bears no relation to the statutory purpose.”313
The “similarly situated” analysis in Williams is fully integrated into
the rational basis review and focused on “fit.”314 It is “infused . . . with
principles traditionally applied in the complete equal protection analysis.”315
B.

Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

Of course, the fact that the analysis is integrated does not dictate any
particular result.316 As we saw in the marriage equality cases in Part I, the
parties will continue to contest whether the legislative classification bears a
close enough relationship to the statutory purpose (and indeed, the statutory
purpose itself). 317
A second example of an integrated equal protection analysis by the
U.S. Supreme Court yielded different results in the majority and dissent,
although both groups of Justices incorporated the “similarly situated”
concept into their merits analysis rather than applying it as a separate, thre
shold test. In Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, in which the Court considered an
equal protection challenge to a statute mandating more burdensome re
quirements to establish citizenship for the children of unmarried U.S.

309

Id. at 23-24.
Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Williams, 472 U.S. at 24.
314 See Araiza, Constitutional Rules, supra note 14 (identifying a “concern with ‘fit’ analysis in
traditional equal protection doctrine”); Araiza, Irrationality and Animus, supra note 14, at 503, 505
(noting the importance of “fit” in equal protection analysis).
315 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 884 n.9 (Iowa 2009).
316 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 564 (“[T]he test cannot provide sure answers to how courts will
resolve the often fierce debate regarding whether a trait bears a sufficiently plausible relationship to a
regulatory context to justify the differential treatment at issue.”).
317 See Simons, supra note 54, at 460 (“In order to conduct means-end analysis, a court must
identify the relevant legislative end which the means must ‘fit.’”).
310
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citizen fathers than for the children of unmarried U.S. citizen mothers,318 the
Court split 5-4 with the majority upholding the constitutionality of the
gender-based distinction. 319
Most significantly, both the majority and the dissent in Tuan Anh
Nguyen performed integrated “similarly situated” analyses, utilizing the
concept in the merits review. 320 Although the two opinions reached different
results, they both focused on the asserted purposes of the statute and their
relationship to the gender-based classification. 321 Neither contemplated that
the “similarly situated” requirement was a “threshold” test.
In his opinion for the Tuan Anh Nguyen majority, Justice Kennedy
wrote that the primary asserted purpose of the statute was “assuring that a
biological parent-child relationship exists” and that because fathers “need
not be present at the birth,” “[f]athers and mothers are not similarly situated
with regard to the proof of biological parenthood.”322 In dissent, Justice
O’Connor took issue with whether this was, in fact, a Congressional aim. 323
She went on to criticize the “fit” between the “asserted end” of the statute
and the gender-based classification, asserting that “sex-neutral alternatives”
were available.324
In response to another of the government’s proffered justifications—
that the statutory classification was intended to ensure a “real” relationship
between parent and child—Justice O’Connor argued that while mothers and
fathers may not be “similarly situated” with respect to the biological
circumstances of birth, they are “similarly situated with respect to the
‘opportunity’ for a relationship” with the child because a father may choose
to be present at a child’s birth.325
In addition to illustrating this Article’s primary argument that “similar
ly situated” analysis is a part of the “fit” question and not just an initial
hurdle, the opposing opinions in Tuan Anh Nguyen also demonstrate once
again how “similarly situated” can be a frame for debating which
318

Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (“The difference between men and women in
relation to the birth process is a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress
to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.”). While a U.S. citizen mother can
transmit citizenship at birth, an unmarried U.S. citizen father must take additional steps: legitimate the
child, make a declaration of paternity, or obtain a court order of paternity. Id. at 62.
319 Id. at 56, 73.
320 Compare id. at 63 (“Fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of
biological parenthood.”), with id. at 86 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he statute on its face accords
different treatment to a mother who is by nature present at birth and a father who is by choice present at
birth even though those two individuals are similarly situated with respect to the ‘opportunity’ for a
relationship.”).
321 See id. at 63 (majority opinion); id. at 80, 85-86 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
322 Id. at 62-63 (majority opinion).
323 Id. at 79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
324 Tuan Anh Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
325 Id.
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differences are “real” or unalterable, and which are socially constructed and
thus potentially subject to stereotype. 326 It can also reveal notions about the
institution at issue, this time parenthood.327 The Tuan Anh Nguyen majority
focused on the biological mechanics of a typical birth, in which the mother
is in labor and the father may or may not attend.328 By contrast, the dissen
ters focused on the “opportunity for a relationship” beginning at birth that a
parent of either gender could establish by choice. 329 Justice O’Connor criti
cized the majority’s reasoning as a stereotype, 330 while Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, countered that “[t]o fail to acknowledge even our
most basic biological differences . . . risks making the guarantee of equal
protection superficial.”331
The Tuan Anh Nguyen opinions illustrate that the line of scrimmage in
an integrated “similarly situated” analysis shifts from focusing on
differences between two groups to debating the statutory aims and the “fit”
between the legislative classification and these asserted goals.332 As Nguyen
illustrates, real conflicts and differences of opinion continue to play out in
the doctrinal analysis. Nonetheless, performing a proper “similarly situated”
analysis, linked to the “fit” with the statutory purpose, is more meaningful
than merely pointing out some differences between the groups at the
outset.333

326 Cf. MINOW, supra note 17, at 107-08, 375 (identifying one legal approach to differences that
assumes “differences as inherent to the ‘different’ person rather than a function of comparisons”);
Simons, supra note 54, at 462 (“Professor Minow has argued . . . against several traditional assumptions
about ‘differences’ in equal protection doctrine . . . for example, that differences are intrinsic rather than
socially constructed . . . .”).
327 See MINOW, supra note 17, at 107-08, 375. For contrasting descriptions of parenthood in the
Tuan Anh Nguyen opinion, see supra note 320.
328 Tuan Anh Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63, 73.
329 Id. at 86-87 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
330 Id. at 87.
331 Id. at 73 (majority opinion).
332 Cf. Simons, supra note 54, at 460 (“In order to conduct means-ends analysis, a court must
identify the relevant legislative end which the means must ‘fit.’”). Compare Tuan Anh Nguyen, 533 U.S.
at 63 (“The requirement of [the statute] represents a reasonable conclusion by the legislature that the
satisfaction of one of several alternatives will suffice to establish the blood link between father and child
required as a predicate to the child’s acquisition of citizenship.”), with id. at 86 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]vailable sex-neutral alternatives would at least replicate, and could easily exceed,
whatever fit there is between [the statute’s] discriminatory means and the majority’s asserted end.”).
333 Cf. Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 954-55 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(“Determining the purpose of government action before embarking on a similarly-situated analysis is
inherent in the individual nature of equal protection rights.”).

620

C.

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 18:3

Gill v. Office of Personnel Management

More recently, the district court opinion in Gill v. Office of Personnel
Management,334 invalidating DOMA, also performed an appropriate
“similarly situated” analysis informed by principles of equal protection. 335
Quoting the “similarly situated” language of Cleburne and Plyler, the
district court began by recognizing that equal protection is “essentially a
direction [to the government] that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.”336 It then proceeded to conduct a rational basis review
informed by these values (i.e., “not a toothless one”).337 The court focused
on the relationship between the classification and the purpose of the
statute.338 “[A] challenged law can only survive this constitutional inquiry if
it is ‘narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context
for [the court] to ascertain some relation between the classification and the
purpose it serve[s],’” it explained. 339 Tying the “rational basis with bite”
review back into the “similarly situated” requirement, the court wrote that
“a law must fail rational basis review where the ‘purported justifications . . .
[make] no sense in light of how the [government] treated other groups
similarly situated in relevant respects.’”340
The court then applied these integrated principles to review the
asserted justifications for the federal government’s restriction of the defini
tion of “marriage” to “a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife.”341 It rejected the proffered purposes of “encouraging
responsible procreation and child-bearing” and “defending and nurturing
the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,” saying that “to the ex
tent that this was the goal, Congress has achieved it ‘only by punishing
same-sex couples.’”342 Similarly, the district court rejected the asserted
goals of “defending traditional notions of morality” and “pre
serv[ing] . . . scarce government resources,” reasoning that neither private
morality nor “negative attitudes or fear” were an appropriate basis for such
a classification.343
334

699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
Id. at 386, 397.
336 Id. at 386 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
337 Id. at 387 (quoting Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
338 Id. at 387-88.
339 Id. at 387 (alteration in original) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
340 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (alterations in original) (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 366 n.4 (2001)).
341 Id. at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted).
342 Id. at 388-89 (quoting In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2009)).
343 Id. at 389-90 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
335
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The Gill court wrote that “it is only sexual orientation that differen
tiates a married couple entitled to federal marriage-based benefits from one
not so entitled” and that it could not see any way in which this difference
was relevant.344 It concluded by again tying its “rational basis with bite”
analysis to the language of the “similarly situated” requirement: “[W]here,
as here, ‘there is no reason to believe that the disadvantaged class is differ
ent, in relevant respects’ from a similarly situated class, this court may
conclude that it is only irrational prejudice that motivates the challenged
classification.”345 Thus, in the Gill court’s opinion, “similarly situated” is an
integrated part of the court’s equal protection analysis.346
D.

An Illustration: Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc.

What difference would it make to switch from a “threshold” to an
“integrated” approach to similarly situated analysis? An Iowa Supreme
Court decision cited in Varnum, which employed a threshold analysis,
provides an example. Ricky Grovijohn was injured in a car accident in
which the driver had been drinking.347 He filed suit under Iowa’s dramshop
statute against the bar that served alcohol to the intoxicated driver.348 The
bar successfully raised an affirmative defense that Grovijohn had failed to
comply with a statutory requirement that dramshop plaintiffs provide notice
of intent to sue to the dramshop within six months of the accident. 349
Grovijohn challenged this notice requirement on equal protection
grounds.350 The Iowa Supreme Court rejected his challenge, reasoning that
because dramshop plaintiffs were not “similarly situated” to other potential
tort plaintiffs, no equal protection challenge was viable. 351 In fact, the Iowa
Court reasoned that because dramshop plaintiffs were not similarly situated
to other plaintiffs, it need “not address whether the dramshop statute has a
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.”352
344

Id. at 396.
Id. at 396-97 (Birch, J., concurring) (second emphasis added) (quoting Lofton v. Sec’y of the
Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004)).
346 The district court opinion in the California case challenging Proposition 8, Perry v. Schwarze
negger, does not contain the verbatim phrase “similarly situated.” See 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010). Nonetheless, the court essentially performed the same equal protection analysis, applying a
rational basis standard of review and concluding that opposite-sex and same-sex couples were “situated
identically . . . in terms of their ability to perform the rights and obligations of marriage under California
law.” Id. at 993. Functionally, the analysis was the same as in Gill, driving home the point that a
properly conducted “similarly situated” analysis does much the same work as “rational basis with bite.”
347 See Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Iowa 2002).
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 Id. at 202.
351 See id. at 204.
352 Id.
345
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Applying an integrated equal protection analysis, the result in
Grovijohn might well be the same. However, the reasoning would differ in
critical ways. The Court would not be able to evade the question of whether
the statutory classification drawn bears a rational relationship to the legisla
tive purpose. Rather, the Court would have to consider whether dramshop
plaintiffs and other civil plaintiffs are similarly situated with respect to the
statutory purpose.353 One possible aim of the notice provision, although not
stated in Grovijohn, is presumably to give bar proprietors notice that they
should preserve records and testimony regarding an accident of which they
may not otherwise be aware. 354 The statutory classification drawn here
might well pass muster under rational basis review on the merits.
Although possibly producing the same outcome in Grovijohn, an inte
grated analysis would avoid logical errors. For example, in its threshold
“similarly situated” analysis, the Iowa Court wrote that “[i]t is significant
all dramshop plaintiffs, as a unique class, are treated alike amongst them
selves . . . [and] are subject to the same requirements of the dramshop
statute.”355 This is precisely the type of tautological reasoning that Tussman
and tenBroek warned against in their seminal article on equal protection.356
CONCLUSION
In an area of the law that is so culturally charged, many factors other
than doctrine can affect the outcome of cases.357 Nonetheless, there is value
in clearing away superfluous hurdles and distractions.358
353

See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 60.
See Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 227 P.3d 42, 46 (Mont. 2009) (noting that the Montana
Legislature added a notice provision to its Dram Shop Act because it is difficult for a potential defen
dant to gather and preserve evidence if that defendant is not aware of the incident giving rise to the suit).
355 Grovijohn, 643 N.W.2d at 204.
356 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 17 (warning against concluding that a statutory classification
passes muster if it “applies equally to all to whom it applies”).
357 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2179-80 (1996) (discussing how courts may continue to reinforce “status regimes” of race
and gender despite changes in formal legal doctrine); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129-31 (1997)
(arguing that the “discriminatory purpose” doctrine “continues to authorize forms of state action that
contribute to the racial and gender stratification of American society”); cf. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d
144, 151 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating that constitutional interpretation is “a Rorschach
test” in which “[w]hat the judge sees . . . is the reflection of his or her own values, values shaped by
personal experience and temperament as well as by historical reflection, public opinion, and other
sources of moral judgment”).
358 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in T HE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 93, 100 (2009) (calling for courts to “[d]ecalcify doctrine” in the area of
equal protection). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitu
tional Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 888 (2010) (discussing doctrines that
354
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In a properly conducted, integrated equal protection analysis, the front
lines of litigation will move—that is, from whether groups or persons are
“similarly situated” in relation to one another359 to the definition of the
statutory purpose,360 and more fundamentally, of the social institution
itself.361 These inquiries can raise big questions, which may touch on deeply
held beliefs. 362 However, debate on this ground, although still hotly
contested, is more authentic.363
Having emerged from the early understanding of equal protection as a
prohibition on “class legislation,”364 “similarly situated” analysis could
figure in a unified, single-tier approach to equal protection. 365 Some
commentators have urged the Court to discard the tiered review, 366 or have
at least questioned its legitimacy. 367 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
express an opinion about the validity of the tiered approach to equal protec
tion analysis. This Article seeks only to demonstrate that “similarly

erect threshold and procedural barriers to the enforcement of constitutional rights and arguing that
“[w]ithout the ability to enforce constitutional rights in the courts, it will be impossible for us to realize
some of our most fundamental constitutional and political values”).
359 MINOW, supra note 17, at 108 (noting that “similarly situated” analysis “retains a general
presumption that differences reside in the different person rather than in relation to norms embedded in
the prevailing institutions”).
360 Cf. Simons, supra note 54, at 460-61 (describing the problems that result from the court
attempting to identify the relevant legislative purpose).
361 See MINOW, supra note 17, at 375 (“We have seen the assumptions about difference deeply
entrenched in our social institutions, and in the legal rules that govern them.”); see also Simons, supra
note 54, at 461-62 (summarizing Martha Minow’s criticisms of “traditional assumptions about
‘differences’ in equal protection,” including “that differences are intrinsic rather than socially
constructed; that an objective rather than subjective perspective exists; that the judged person’s perspec
tive is irrelevant or has already been considered; and that the status quo is natural and neutral”).
362 See MINOW, supra note 17, at 108; Goldberg, supra note 20, at 564.
363 MINOW, supra note 17, at 375; Goldberg, supra note 20, at 564.
364 See supra notes 170-72.
365 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 527-28.
366 Professor Suzanne Goldberg has argued that the tiered approach was merely an “unwitting
training vehicle” or a “transitional analytic tool” that supported post-Lochner, mid-twentieth-century
courts in analyzing “identity-based discrimination by government” and ferreting out “impermissible
stereotyping or bias.” Id. at 582. She has proposed a three-step, single-tier approach to equal protection,
in which the second step is “whether the justification offered for the line drawing has a specific relation
ship to the classification’s context.” Id. at 533. “Similarly situated” analysis, properly understood, is
equivalent to the second step of this proposed unified standard. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 358,
at 100 (writing that “[c]ourts must give up their preoccupation with formal classification” in equal
protection doctrine); cf. Araiza, supra note 225, at 488 (describing the equal protection doctrine and the
tiered approach as an “almost ad hoc body of case law”).
367 See Araiza, supra note 225, at 502 (“[T]he Carolene-based structure of tiered scrutiny is
generally understood as the Court’s attempt to create a judicially workable approach to constitutional
review in the face of the questionable legitimacy of such review in the service of unenumerated, or in
this case vague rights.”).
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situated” is a statement of equal protection meaning that appeared in the
doctrine long before our current formulation of the tiered structure.368
In sum, “similarly situated” analysis is not a preliminary showing
required to proceed to equal protection review. It is a restatement of the
most central concern of equal protection—the relationship between the
legislative line-drawing and the purpose of the statute.369 Although currently
somewhat redundant of the tiered review, “similarly situated” is properly
understood as being “infused with principles traditionally applied in the
complete equal protection analysis.”370
“Similarly situated” should not be used as an end-run around equal
protection review.371 When litigants attempt to circumvent the full rigor of
equal protection analysis by asserting that two groups of persons are not
“similarly situated,” it is a gambit.
The uses and misuses of “similarly situated” illustrate how doctrinal
constructs can become reified. 372 This Article has advocated an integrated
analysis that emphasizes equal protection over formalism. 373

368

See Goldberg, supra note 20, at 485; supra notes 263-80 and accompanying text.
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 17, at 344; see also Araiza, Constitutional Rules, supra note
14, at 56-57; Araiza, Irrationality and Animus, supra note 14, at 505-06; Engles, supra note 14, at 173
74; Goldberg, supra note 20, at 515-16.
370 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 884 n.9 (Iowa 2009).
371 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435 n.54 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. C ONST. art. I, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through 2010), as recognized in Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D.
Cal. 2010); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 884 n.9; Baker, supra note 107, at 386; Carroll-Ferrary, supra note
107, at 610-11.
372 Cf. Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (explaining
that “judge-created constitutional doctrine is not identical to judge-interpreted constitutional meaning”);
Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA.
L. REV. 1649, 1655 (2005) (building on Berman’s “decision rules” framework and noting that “[t]here is
room for disagreement about the status of particular doctrinal formulations—whether they are constitu
tional operative propositions or decision rules”); Yoshino, supra note 20, at 750 (“We need to look past
doctrinal categories to see that the rights secured within those categories are often hybrid rights.”).
373 Cf. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 491 (arguing that a three-step, single-tier approach to equal
protection may aid in “revitalizing meaningful equal protection review at the highest and lowest
levels”).
369

